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MEDIATION BY MASS DISCHARGE:
HOW AN OBSCURE NOTICE REQUIREMENT IN
THE NLRA WAS MADE A DEATHTRAP FOR
INNOCENT STRIKERS
MIKE LEWIS*
The workers at Boghosian Raisin Packing Company were fed up. Their
union, Local 616 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, had
represented them for many years, and relations between the union and the
company had always been good. But in the negotiations for a new
collective-bargaining agreement to succeed the one that expired on May 31,
1999, the employer, located in Fowler, California, had taken a harder line
than ever before, demanding major concessions in pay and other terms of
employment.1
And so, on September 22, 1999, the workers took a vote to reject the
company’s latest offer and to authorize a strike.2 On October 1, at their
leaders’ call, they walked out of the plant.3
But seven days before, upon hearing that the union would strike if an
agreement had not been reached by the end of the month, the company’s
counsel and chief negotiator contacted the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (“FMCS”) and asked whether the union had filed a
notice of dispute with the agency.4 He was told that no such notice had
been filed. From that day until the strike began, the company’s counsel did
not reveal to the union’s negotiators that he knew this—even at the parties’
last negotiating session on September 30.5
A half hour after the employees walked out on October 1, the employer’s
counsel called the union and informed its officers that its strike was illegal
because the union had not sent a notice of dispute to the FMCS.6 After
quickly confirming that this was true, the union offered to end the strike. 7
But the company replied that it was “reserving all its options,” including
“the right to impose discipline up to and including discharge.”8 It also said
it might “pick and choose, bring back some but not all” of the workers.9
The company agreed to meet with the union, but only to see if it was ready
*Mike Lewis is a senior counsel at the National Labor Relations Board. The views
expressed in this article are his views alone and not those of the National Labor
Relations Board or the United States Government.
1
Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., 342 N.L.R.B. 383, 388, 389 (2004).
2
Id. at 388.
3
Id. at 384.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 384, 388.
6
Id. at 384.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 389.
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to make new bargaining concessions.10
At that meeting the following day, the company repeated that it
“was reserving all options.”11 The union made no new proposal, and
nothing was resolved.12 Two days later the union again offered to return to
work under the parties’ pre-existing terms of employment and resume
bargaining.13 The company again reserved its right to terminate “all
employees who engaged in the illegal strike,” and now stated that all the
strikers would be fired unless the union proved by the following day that it
had given timely notice to the FMCS.14 The next day the union again
offered to return to work, this time on the basis of the company’s last
offer.15 But later that day the Company sent discharge letters to forty-two
of the forty-five striking employees.16 The company then hired
replacements.17 Four months later, acting on a petition from the new
employees saying they did not want the union to represent them, the
company withdrew recognition from the union.18
As Boghosian’s counsel had known, the union, as the party seeking to
renegotiate the expired contract, was required under Section 8(d)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) to file a notice of
dispute with the FMCS at least 30 days before engaging in a strike.19
Before the strike the union’s leaders thought they had complied with this
requirement. They had in fact sent such a notice to the California Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the state agency analogous to the FMCS, as
Section 8(d)(3) also required.20 However, although the union's secretarytreasurer had also filled out a notice form for the FMCS, that notice was
never mailed due to a clerical oversight. The secretary-treasurer, who had
never before led a strike, later testified that he never checked for a return
receipt to confirm that the FMCS notice was sent because he “just didn't
know the legal significance . . . of mailing it.”21
The legal significance for the Boghosian strikers lay in the following
sentence in the Act’s Section 8(d): “Any employee who engages in a strike
within any notice period specified in this subsection . . . shall lose his status
10

Id. at 384, 388-89.
Id. at 389.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 384, 389, 394
15
Id. at 389.
16
Id. (“The Respondent . . . retain[ed] only three strikers who had special needed
skills.”).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (2006).
20
Boghosian, 342 N.L.R.B. at 388.
21
Id. at 384.
11
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as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for
the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act . . . .”22 Because Sections 8,
9, and 10 protect the rights only of statutory “employees,” this meant—as
that sentence (the “loss-of-status provision”) has been interpreted—that the
strikers had lost the Act’s protection and could be fired at the employer’s
whim for almost any reason.
The mass discharge at Boghosian cost forty-two people their jobs—in all
likelihood the last union-represented jobs they would ever have. Those
workers had not shared in the union’s negligence, and they almost certainly
knew nothing about Section 8(d)(3) or its notice requirements. They had no
intention of violating the law and, like their union officers, they had
believed that their strike was lawful. The union had also complied with
every other procedural requirement the NLRA imposes.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board“), and the agency’s General
Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the company had violated
Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the Act by discharging the strikers in
retaliation for union activity and by withdrawing recognition from the
union.23 But on June 30, 2004, the majority of a three-member panel of the
Board (Chairman Robert Battista and Member Peter Schaumber), with one
member dissenting (Member Wilma Liebman), held that the strikers lost
their status as statutory employees under Section 8(d) and that their mass
discharge was lawful. They relied for this finding on an earlier Board
case—Fort Smith Chair Co.24
In reaching their conclusion, the majority found that the company had
done nothing wrong—even though, as Member Liebman noted in her
dissent, it had concealed its awareness of the union’s notice infraction
before the strike, used the infraction as a club to extract additional
bargaining concessions after the strike began, and after this attempted
coercion had failed (and only then) fired the strikers.25 It did not even
matter if the company, having failed to obtain satisfactory concessions, was
motivated primarily by a wish to rid itself of the union rather than to punish

22

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
Boghosian, 342 N.L.R.B. at 393. Section 8(a)(3), in pertinent part, makes it unlawful
for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (2006). Section 8(a)(5), in pertinent part, makes it
unlawful for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(5).
24
Id. at 385 n.7(citing Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 514 (1963), affd. sub nom.
United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738, 742 (D.C.
Cir. 1964)).
25
Id. at 385.
23
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its employees for breaking the law.26 To the majority, “the Respondent's
willingness to continue bargaining [was] indicative of its good faith,” and
“it was entitled to press its advantage in negotiations.”27
Fort Smith, on which the Boghosian majority relied, was the Board
precedent that first applied Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision to an
8(d)(3) infraction. That case, decided in 1963, addressed Section 8(d) in its
original form, as it had been inserted into the NLRA in 1947 by the TaftHartley Act.28 Although Fort Smith was only an opinion from a twomember plurality from a full Board (i.e., a panel of all five Board
members), that opinion has consistently, though with little analysis, been
treated as authoritative by the Board and the federal courts ever since. This
deference continued after 1974, when Congress amended the Act, including
Section 8(d), to cover nonprofit hospitals and to address specific issues
related to collective bargaining in the health-care industry (“the Health
Care Amendments”).29 Because of this deference, the Boghosian episode
was only one of the latest in a line of cases in which hundreds of employees
outside the health-care industry have lost or been threatened with the loss
of their jobs in consequence of similar failures by their unions to file timely
notice with the FMCS.
This has resulted in a feature unique in American law. In the 223 years
since the first Congress convened in 1789, Congress has imposed various
obligations and related liabilities on U.S. citizens and organizations. But in
no other instance has a federal statute that supposedly protects the rights of
individuals to engage in peaceful activity been held to deprive those
individuals of that protection—and at the cost of their very livelihoods,
with no remedy or recourse—if an organization representing those
individuals violates a notice-filing requirement without their even being
aware of it. No other sector of American law contains a feature so barbaric.
(As a matter of corporate law, by contrast, most corporations have the legal
effect—and purpose—of shielding their shareowners from liability for the
misconduct they commit.)
And as Boghosian illustrates, the negligence that results in a union’s
failure to file the required notice with the FMCS recurs periodically. All
organizations—even public enforcement agencies—make ministerial errors
on occasion. This is particularly true of local unions outside the health-care
sector whose members work at isolated facilities that do not bargain
through multi-unit, nationally administered chains. It is not difficult for
even highly competent local union officers to overlook a technical

26

Id. at 386.
Id.
28
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
29
See infra Part III.A.
27
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requirement for which compliance rarely has any practical effect.30 Unless
the Board revisits Fort Smith, this precedent will be applied each time that
happens and the employer involved takes advantage of it.
But the Fort Smith plurality opinion, despite its lineage, was wrong. The
Taft-Hartley Congress, anti-union though it was, did not intend to subject
striking workers to the complete loss of the Act’s protection, and of their
jobs, for an infraction of Section 8(d)(3) committed by their union. Still
less did it intend to give employers like Boghosian an offensive weapon to
extort additional bargaining concessions. Nor did Congress later endorse
Fort Smith or its interpretation of Section 8(d) in the 1974 Health Care
Amendments with respect to employees outside the health-care sector, even
though the manner in which Congress re-worded that section’s loss-ofstatus provision may seem to obscure this. The Act, which recognizes and
protects employees’ right to engage in concerted activity to improve their
working conditions, has never authorized the mass firing of strikers outside
the health-care sector for a clerical omission to file a notice with the FMCS
which they were not responsible for—nor should it.
This article will explain how this part of the Act has been misinterpreted
for 50 years. Section I will review the 1947 enactment of Section 8(d), its
original loss-of-status provision, the Taft-Hartley Congress’s intent behind
that provision, and the provision’s initial implementation. Section II will
explain why the interpretation of the loss-of-status provision by the Fort
30

As discussed infra Part I.A, the theoretical purpose of the FMCS notice requirement
is to facilitate the peaceful resolution of bargaining disputes. In practice, however,
scarcity of resources and the need (not to mention a statutory mandate) to prioritize
have always precluded the FMCS from taking a proactive role in response to most such
notices. In fiscal year 2012, the agency received 18,101 “F-7” notices of dispute at nonhealth care employers in the private sector. Of these, only 9,476 were actually assigned
to mediators. FMCS Response to the author’s Freedom of Information Act Request,
October 31, 2012. Under the agency’s established procedure, it is the assignment of a
case to a mediator that triggers the sending of a letter offering FMCS assistance to both
parties in the dispute. The parties in almost half of the private-sector, non-health care
disputes that were noticed to the FMCS therefore had no further involvement with the
agency. Moreover, only 1,297 of the cases assigned to a mediator were actually
mediated. Id. In addition, by informal practice the agency prioritizes notices of dispute
by imminence of contract expiration and size of bargaining unit, with only those units
of 1,000 or more workers receiving automatic priority. FMCS Response to the author’s
FOIA Request, March 6, 2012. In short, although due to no fault of the FMCS, in most
cases (and particularly for smaller employers) an 8(d)(3) notice amounts to little more
than a bureaucratic exercise, and the failure to file the notice has no practical
consequence for resolving the dispute. Cf. Chauffeurs Local 572, 223 N.L.R.B. 1003,
1006 (1976), decided two years after the enactment of the Health Care Amendments
(“It is generally agreed between the parties . . . that these agencies [the FMCS and the
analogous state mediation agency] do not systematically intervene unless requested by
the parties, even where they have been notified, pursuant to the statutory provisions, of
the existence of a dispute.”).
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Smith plurality was fundamentally wrong. Section III will review the
Health Care Amendments of 1974 and what Congress intended—and, more
important, what it did not intend—when it revised Section 8(d) at that time.
Section IV will review the continued application of Fort Smith in the wake
of the Health Care Amendments to date. The article concludes that
Congress did not legislate with respect to employees in industries other
than health care in 1974, and that the NLRB therefore remains free to
correct an error that will otherwise victimize other innocent workers.
I.

THE ORIGINAL LOSS-OF-STATUS PROVISION
A. The Taft-Hartley Act

The Taft-Hartley Act changed the NLRA, as enacted in the original
Wagner Act of 1935,31 in many ways, some of them favoring employers
and most of them disfavoring unions.32 But it reconfirmed the NLRA’s
essential objective:
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.33
Taft-Hartley also preserved intact the NLRA’s original charter of
workers’ organizing rights, its Section 7: “Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection . . . .”34
In short, Taft-Hartley retained the dual purpose of the original NLRA.
One purpose was “to preserve a competitive business economy;”35 the other
was “to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions

31

National Labor Relations Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 449.
See, e.g., THE COLD WAR ON LABOR 243-49, 258-67, 306-13, 324-25, 399-429
(1987) (A. Ginger and D. Christiano, eds.).
33
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
34
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
35
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956).
32
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through the agency of collective bargaining.”36 Any reasonable application
of the Act’s requirements and sanctions had to be made in the light of both
those purposes.
Among the innovations Taft-Hartley created to minimize the disruption
of commerce caused by strikes was the FMCS—a federal agency (created
from an existing agency) to facilitate the orderly resolution of industrial
disputes.37 The FMCS was mandated to “assist parties to labor disputes in
industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation
and mediation.”38 It was authorized to “proffer its services in any labor
dispute in any industry affecting commerce, either upon its own motion or
upon the request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, whenever in
its judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of
commerce;”39 but it was specifically “directed” to “avoid attempting to
mediate disputes which would have only a minor effect on interstate
commerce if State or other conciliation services are available to the
parties.”40
That is, with respect to mediating collective-bargaining disputes, the
FMCS—like any agency with a mission—was to set priorities. Given the
national scope of its mission, it could hardly do otherwise. It would
prioritize threats of “substantial interruptions of commerce,” while skipping
over minor disputes whenever alternative state or other conciliation
services were available – i.e., the large majority of disputes.41 This meant
that in a significant number of cases it would not—could not—be
involved.42
Taft-Hartley also imposed the notice and bargaining requirements
embodied in Section 8(d) on the parties to collective-bargaining
agreements.43 Where an agreement was in effect and one of the parties
36

Id.
The resources and functions of the former agency, the Department of Labor’s
Conciliation Service, were transferred to the FMCS. House Conf. Rep. No. 510, (1 st
Sess. 1947), at 62; NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 1947, at 566.
38
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 153; now
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(a).
39
Id. at 153-54; now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(b) (2006).
40
Id. at 154.
41
The FMCS was also mandated/authorized to facilitate the settlement of grievance
disputes arising from collective-bargaining agreements, but “only as a last resort and in
exceptional cases.” Id. at 154; now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (2006).
42
See supra note 30.
43
Section 8(d) in its original entirety provided as follows: For the purposes of this
section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
emp1oyer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question thereunder, and the
37
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intended to seek an extension or modification of its terms after its date of
expiration, the employer or union came under four enumerated
requirements: (1) to give written notice to the other party of that intent at
least sixty days before the contract’s expiration date;44 (2) to offer to
bargain with the other party for a new or modified contract;45 (3) to notify
the FMCS and any analogous state mediation agency of the dispute “within
thirty days after such notice” if no agreement had been reached by that
time;46 and (4) to maintain all the current terms of employment without
resorting to strike or lock-out “for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given” or until the contract expired, whichever occurred later.47

execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collectivebargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract sha1l terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification –
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the
event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is
proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new
contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after
such notice of the existence of a dispute and simultaneously therewith notifies any State
or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or
Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that
time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice
is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs
{2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the
Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the
contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees
subject to the provisions of section 9(a), and the duties so imposed shall not be
construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms
and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to
become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the
provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day
period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer
engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this
Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when
he is reemployed by such employer. Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat.
142-43; now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added).
44
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (2006).
45
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2006).
46
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (2006).
47
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (2006).
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The underlying reason for each of these requirements was obvious. In
order to ensure that the union and the employer would have an opportunity
to agree on new terms of employment before the previous ones expired, it
was necessary for the initiating party to provide the other with timely
notice of intent to seek changes. This would ensure that bargaining could
start long enough before the end of the contract term to permit a peaceful
settlement by the date of expiration, minimizing the risk of a strike,
lockout, or unilateral change in terms of employment. In order for the
FMCS to have an opportunity to intervene in any dispute in time to be
effective, the agency had to receive timely notification that a settlement had
not yet been reached. In order for bargaining to proceed without disruption
during this protected period, it was necessary for the parties to maintain
their current terms of employment without engaging in self-help.
It is significant in the light of later events, however, that the party
seeking to renegotiate was required under Section 8(d)(1) to “serve a
written notice” on the other party “sixty days prior to the [contract’s]
expiration date,” and by Section 8(d)(4) to refrain from striking, locking
out, or imposing unilateral changes for “a period of sixty days after such
notice is given.”48 This is because the same party was required by Section
8(d)(3) only to “notify” the FMCS of the potential dispute within thirty
days after giving “such notice.”49 Although the emphasized terms are
similar and overlap in meaning, their use would normally reflect a
distinction in Congressional intent.50
In this instance, the reason for the use of different terms was made clear
elsewhere in Section 8(d). For in order to ensure that unions and the
workers they represented took the above requirements seriously, the
section’s original loss-of-status provision imposed a penalty for
noncompliance specifically in connection with strikes: “Any employee who
engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection
shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the
particular labor dispute, for the purposes of Sections 8, 9, and 10 of this
Act, as amended . . . .”51
48

29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), (4) (2006) (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
50
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) ( “It is difficult to
reconcile the Government’s contrary reading [of a provision not specifying ‘act or
omission’] with the fact that two of the Act’s other exceptions specifically reference an
‘act or omission.’”); White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004) (“It is
axiomatic that when Congress uses different text in ‘adjacent’ statutes it intends that
the different terms carry a different meaning.”), overruled on other grounds, Hayward
v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010).
51
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 143
(emphasis added). Some recent authorities refer to the loss-of-status provision as being
part of Sec. 8(d)(4). E.g., Douglas Auto Parts, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 111, slip op. at 3 n.8,
49
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The divergent use of “serve a written notice” in Section 8(d)(1) and (by
reference) (4), and “notifies” in Section 8(d)(3), coupled with the loss-ofstatus provision’s explicit correlation to “the sixty-day period specified” in
Section 8(d)(1) and (4), was a direct reflection of Congressional intent. The
legislative history of the language in the Senate bill that became Section
8(d) is entirely consistent on this point. From the moment this language
was introduced, its sponsors referred to the application of the loss-of-status
provision exactly as did the final provision itself—as a sanction for striking
during “the 60-day period” initiated by the notice to the opposite party of
intent to renegotiate the contract.52 No member of Congress, no committee
report, and no language in any bill or amendment under consideration in
1947 referred to the loss-of-status provision, directly or indirectly, as
applicable to the FMCS notification requirement imposed by Section
8(d)(3), or to any failure to comply with that requirement.
This was understandable. Of the two notifications required, the first—the
“written notice” to the other party to the contract, required by Section
8(d)(1)—was clearly viewed as the more elementary and essential.
Assistance from the FMCS in cases that threaten a “substantial interruption
of commerce”53 might be helpful, sometimes even critical. But the
participation of both parties, timely communication between them, and an
orderly bargaining schedule were vital to the renegotiation of each and
every collective-bargaining agreement, no matter how obscure. In addition,
Congress recognized that wildcat strikes sometimes occur even where the
union’s leaders attempt to prevent them. It was therefore not unreasonable
for Congress to impose a severe sanction on strikers for striking within “the
sixty-day period specified in this sub-section.”
Nor was it irrational (though it was highly draconian) for Congress to
attribute responsibility to employees for ensuring that their union complied
with Section 8(d)(1) before they embarked on a strike. Although
represented workers could not be expected to know everything their union
leaders were doing from day to day, they were presumably in regular
contact with the union and in daily contact with their employer. The subject
of impending contract negotiations could reasonably be expected to come
up in their conversations with their stewards, their union officers, and their
supervisors. If the employer had received no 8(d)(1) notice from the union
before contract expiration, that might (at least in theory) become known to
4 (2011), review pending (D.C. Cir.). Given the atypical structure of Sec. 8(d), this is
arguably permissible. However, in order to avoid confusion this article refers to the
loss-of-status provision as an independent component of Section 8(d).
52
S. 1126, 80th Cong. § 8(d) (1947) at 166; H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 8(d) (1947) (as
passed by the Senate); S. REP. NO. 105 § 8(d) (1947) (1947); HOUSE REP. NO. 510,
(1947) (Conf. Rep.), 35; 93 Cong Rec. 1015, 1048 (1947); NLRB, Legislative History
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947.
53
29 U.S.C. § 173 (2006).
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the unit members through these conversations. There was therefore a
perceivable (if strained) logic to treating the union and its members as
sharing a common responsibility for ensuring that the employer received
the required “written notice” of intent to bargain and possibly strike.
It would not have been realistic, however—even for the Republican
Congress in 1947—to attribute to every worker in a bargaining unit a close
familiarity with Section 8(d)(3)’s requirement of notification to the FMCS.
Nor would it have been reasonable to inflict a complete loss of the Act’s
protection on strikers for their union’s failure to comply with that
requirement. It is a safe generalization that employees are less aware of the
FMCS, with which they have no direct contact, than they are of their own
employer and their union. Nor are workers frequent practitioners—let alone
attorneys—in the field of labor law. Treating strikers as responsible for
their unions’ 8(d)(3) infractions would therefore have been a highly
inefficient means of ensuring union compliance with that notification
requirement. So while a failure to “notify” the FMCS in compliance with
Section 8(d)(3) might be unlawful, it did not follow as a matter of logic,
equity, or policy that the penalty imposed should extend beyond the
culpable union. It would have been particularly disproportionate to subject
unknowing strikers to permanent discharge for their union’s infraction
under a statute which the Supreme Court had by 1947 already held never to
authorize the imposition of “punitive” remedies on employers for any
unfair labor practices they might commit, no matter how blatant or
destructive those practices might be.54
For these reasons, it is not surprising that Section 8(d)’s original loss-ofstatus provision applied by its own terms solely to “the sixty-day period
specified in this subsection [i.e., Section 8(d)(1) and (4)],” and not to the
thirty-day notification period in Section 8(d)(3) pertaining to the FMCS.
Moreover, the loss-of-status provision was explicitly mandated by the Act
to be read narrowly. Section 13, also inserted by Taft-Hartley, provided
that “[n]othing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that
right.”55 Under this interpretive prohibition, any restriction on—or penalty
for—striking imposed in Section 8(d) had to be clear and explicit, and
could not be imputed from a different one.
Collective bargaining, including mediation and the FMCS, functioned
54

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 208-09 (1941) (noting that the remedies
are remedial rather than punitive); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
235 (1938) (emphasizing that power to invoke remedies does not give the Board
absolute power; damages must be remedial).
55
Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 151 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
163) (emphasis added).
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quite well under this implicit understanding of the law until 1963.
B. The Implementation of Section 8(d)’s Notice Requirements
From 1947 to 1963, the NLRB and the courts enforced Section 8(d) in a
relatively straightforward manner. The loss-of-status provision was applied,
pursuant to its terms, where a union engaged in a strike without having
given sixty days’ notice to the employer pursuant to Section 8(d)(1) and
(4).56 And specifically with respect to Section 8(d)(3)’s requirement of
notification to the FMCS, in Retail Clerks57 the Board found that a union
that engaged in a strike without providing the required notification to the
FMCS refused to bargain collectively within the meaning of Section 8(d)
and consequently violated the Act’s Section 8(b)(3).58
In Retail Clerks, the Board rejected the union’s argument that the FMCS
notification requirement was “a mere subordinate or ‘ancillary’ aspect of
the statute,” and emphasized that “[t]here is nothing to indicate that
Congress regarded this mandatory requirement as less significant than any
other of the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (d) . . . .”59 In that case,
however, the loss-of-status provision was not put at issue, even though the
strike was continuing.60 The Board therefore did not address it and gave no
indication that it viewed the “significance” it attributed to Section 8(d)(3)
as warranting the forfeit of strikers’ protected employee status. Its decision
merely confirmed that a strike following the union’s failure to comply with
Section 8(d)(3) was, like a strike following the failure to comply with
Section 8(d)(1), an unfair labor practice by the union and would be treated
as one. The remedy ordered for noncompliance was the same for both: the
union was ordered to cease and desist from striking or ordering a strike
without complying with Section 8(d).61
56

United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338,
342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
57
Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1179,109 N.L.R.B. 754 (1954).
58
Id. at 756-59; see also Broward Cnty. Carpenters’ Dist. Council, 122 N.L.R.B. 1008,
1015-16 (1959). Section 8(b)(3), enacted in the Taft-Hartley Act, defines a union’s
refusal to bargain collectively as an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2006).
It is analogous to Section 8(a)(5), which similarly defines an employer’s refusal to
bargain collectively as an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
59
109 N.L.R.B. at 758.
60
Id. at 759.
61
Id. at 759. The Board similarly found that where a union filed the required FMCS
notification but went on strike less than thirty days after doing so, the union violated
sec. 8(d)(3). Local Union 219, Retail Clerks Int’l Assoc.,120 N.L.R.B. 272, 279-80
(1958), aff’d and enf’d, 265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United Mine Workers of Am.,
Dist. 50, 118 NLRB 220, 226 (1957). The Board also found that a strike called without
the filing of timely notice with the appropriate state mediation agency (where one
existed) also violated secs. 8(b)(3) and 8(d)(3). Local No. 156, United Packinghouse
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In other respects, the Board defined the requirements of Section 8(d) in
ways that respected Section 7 activity, including the right to strike. In
Mastro Plastics62 it found, with the Supreme Court’s approval, that Section
8(d)’s strike restrictions and sanctions applied only to economic strikes, as
opposed to unfair labor practice strikes.63 This was true even where the
unfair labor practice strike occurred during the term of a contract that by its
own terms prohibited “any strike”—and notwithstanding the terms of
Section 8(d)(4), which on their face would seem to prohibit any strikes
during the term of any contract.64
In upholding the Board’s position, the Supreme Court recognized “the
two declared congressional policies” embodied in the Act, noted supra, that
had to be reconciled: “[t]he one seeks to preserve a competitive business
economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its
conditions through the agency of collective bargaining.”65 In addition to
attributing equal weight to these two policies, the Court found that Section
13’s negation of any restriction on the right to strike which the Act did not
make fully explicit “adds emphasis to the Board's insistence upon
preserving the employees' right to strike to protect their freedom of
concerted action.”66 Since the Act did not state that unfair labor practice
strikes were unlawful, the Court observed, “Section 13 adds emphasis to
the congressional recognition of their propriety.”67A contrary interpretation
of the Act, the Court continued, “would have the incongruous effect of
Workers of Am., 117 NLRB 670, 678 (1957); see also Amalgamated Meatcutters and
Butcher Workmen of N. Am., Local 576, 140 N.L.R.B. 876, 879-80 (1963); Bhd. of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 130 N.L.R.B. 1147, 1153-54 (1961) (set aside on
other gr’ds (302 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1962)).
62
Mastro Plastics Corp.,103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953), enf’d, NLRB v. Mastro Plastics
Corp. 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954), aff’d, Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB 350 U.S. 270
(1956).
63
Id. at 518. While an economic strike is intended to defend or improve employees’
terms of employment, an unfair labor practice strike is a protest against misconduct
committed by the employer in violation of the Act. E.g., Mastro Plastics Co, 350 U.S
at 286-87. Economic strikers can be “permanently replaced” during the strike, and after
being replaced they can recover their jobs only as they are vacated by the replacement
employees. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 346 (1938); Laidlaw
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1368-69 (1968), enfd., 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). Unfair
labor practice strikers, on the other hand, are entitled to recover their jobs when they
unconditionally offer to return to work. NLRB v. Int’l Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50-51
(1972).
64
Mastro Plastics, 103 NLRB at 516-18. Mastro Plastics did not determine whether
the strike at issue had violated the contract’s no-strike provision, or otherwise address
the legal consequences of violating that provision apart from Section 8(d).
65
350 U.S. 270, 279 (1956), (quoting Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945)).
66
350 U.S. at 284.
67
Id.
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cutting off the employees’ freedom to strike against unfair labor practices
aimed at [their union] representative.”68 The loss-of-status provision, in
short, was not to be applied outside the context specifically intended for it
by Congress.
In Lion Oil,69 again with the Supreme Court’s approval, the Board found
that where a collective-bargaining agreement authorized negotiations for a
pre-expiration modification of particular contract terms—e.g., pay
increases—and the union gave the required notice of intent to modify those
terms under Section 8(d)(1), the union could strike in connection with that
modification after the prescribed sixty-day period even though the contract
had not “expired” by reaching its termination date.70 The Board took this
position notwithstanding Section 8(d)(4)’s prohibition on striking before
the end of the sixty-day period or until the contract’s expiration date,
“whichever occurs later.”71 The Board also noted that Section 8(d)’s lossof-status provision, “by its terms . . . applies only to those employees who
strike within the sixty-day period specified by the statute.”72
The Court agreed with the Board that Section 8(d)’s imposition of its
notice requirements on any “termination or modification” of a contract
showed that Congress intended the section to permit midterm
modifications, even though Section 8(d)(4) referred only to a contract’s
“expiration” date.73 Accordingly, “Congress meant by ‘expiration date’ in §
8(d)(1) to encompass both situations, and the same phrase in § 8(d)(4) must
carry the same meaning.”74 In addition, the Court observed, given the “dual
purpose in the Taft-Hartley Act—to substitute collective bargaining for
economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in
concerted activities for their own benefit . . . [a] construction which serves
neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen

68

Id. at 286.
Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 680 (1954), set aside, 221 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1955),
rev’d, 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
70
Id. at 683-84; see also United Packinghouse Workers of Am., 89 N.L.R.B. 310
(1950) (defining “expiration date” through its reading of Congressional intent as
signifying the date when a labor contract is subject to modification or termination). In
United Packinghouse, the Board noted that a union in that setting would have
committed a violation under “a purely literal reading of Section 8(d)(4),” but that that
such a reading would lead to “patently unreasonable” consequences for midterm
modification arrangements. 89 N.L.R.B. at 313-14. The Board relied on Taft-Hartley’s
legislative history to confirm that “the prime purpose of Section 8(d) was to prevent socalled ‘quickie’ strikes.” Id. at 316.
71
Lion Oil Co., 109 NLRB at 769; 89 NLRB at 335.
72
United Packinghouse Workers, 89 N.L.R.B. at 314 (emphasis in original).
73
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 289-90 (1957).
74
Id. at 290.
69
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clearly compel it.”75 Again, accordingly, the loss-of-status provision was
not applied in a situation for which it was not intended by Congress; and
Section 8(d)’s notice requirements were interpreted in a way that respected
unions’ bargaining rights.
In short, until 1963 the Board, with the Supreme Court’s endorsement,
had inferred the Congressional intent behind Section 8(d) by focusing not
only on its procedural requirements but on its underlying purpose—to
encourage collective bargaining while respecting the Section 7 rights of
workers. This balanced approach was about to change.
II. FORT SMITH: A PLURALITY OPINES
A. The Case
On March 27, 1961, United Furniture Workers Local 270 gave timely
notice to Fort Smith Chair Co. of its intention to bargain for “a new and
modified agreement” to replace the one to expire on May 31.76 The union
did not, however, file a notice with the FMCS or any state mediation
agency.77 At two negotiating sessions on May 29 and 31, the parties agreed
on some issues but failed to reach a total agreement. The employer,
asserting that it had lost money over the four preceding years, insisted on a
clause stating that “no employee has a vested right in any level of incentive
earnings,” which the union refused to accept.78 On June 1, the union’s
members voted the employer’s final offer down, and later the same day
they went on strike.79
On June 7, the parties met again, this time with an FMCS agent present.
The parties failed to reach agreement, but either the day before or at this
session the employer learned that the union had filed no FMCS notice.80
The following day the employer informed the union by telegram that it
would hold no further negotiations and that “the employment of all people
75

Id. at 289 (internal citation omitted). In a separate concurrence, Justice Frankfurter
stated categorically that “[t]he loss-of-status clause . . . speaks of 'the sixty-day period
specified in this subsection,' and, to be effective under the present Board's construction
[i.e., that Sec. 8(d)’s 60-day notice and no-strike requirements were applicable to
midterm modifications], this clause has to be understood as reading 'the period
specified in paragraph (4).'” Id. at 303 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
76
Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 NLRB 514, 528 (1963).
77
Id. The reason is not clear, but there is no indication that the omission was deliberate.
78
Id. at 528-29.
79
Id. at 529.
80
Id. According to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which
reviewed the record, the company learned of the Union’s infraction in a conversation
with a federal mediator on June 6. United Furniture Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 336
F.2d 738, 740 (1964).
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who have participated in the unlawful strike is terminated.”81 The employer
also sent letters to all the strikers stating: “As a result of your participation
in the illegal work stoppage . . . your services with this Company are
terminated.”82 On June 13, the employer hired replacements and the plant
resumed production.83 The union subsequently notified the employer that
the strike was terminated and requested reinstatement of all the strikers, but
none were taken back; some were eventually rehired as new employees.84
At trial before a trial examiner (“TE”),85 the General Counsel contended
that the strike had not been intended to “terminate or modify” the parties’
contract within the meaning of Section 8(d), and that the union was
therefore not covered by Section 8(d)(3)’s FMCS notification
requirement.86 Moreover, the General Counsel contended, the company’s
motive for the mass discharge had been to rid itself of the union, and the
action consequently violated section 8(a)(3); and the company’s subsequent
refusal to bargain further with the union violated Section 8(a)(5).87
The union agreed with the General Counsel but argued in addition that
the company had not bargained in good faith from the outset, that this had
caused the strike, and that the strike was accordingly an unfair labor
practice strike rather than an economic practice strike.88 On this additional
ground, the union contended that the strike was exempted from Section
8(d)(3)’s notification requirement under Mastro Plastics, in which the
Supreme Court had limited Section 8(d)’s notice requirements to economic
strikes.89 The company, of course, asserted that the strikers had lost their
status as protected employees due to the union’s failure to file timely
notification with the FMCS and were lawfully discharged for participating
in an unlawful strike, and that its withdrawal of recognition from the union
was lawful as well.90
The TE rejected the union’s argument that the company had bargained in
bad faith and that the work stoppage was an unfair labor practice strike.91
But he accepted the General Counsel’s argument that the union had not

81

Id.
Id. The employer also sent letters to those employees who had not been scheduled to
work on June 1 stating that they would be treated as participating in the strike and
similarly terminated if they did not report for work by June 13. Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 530.
85
Prior to the advent of administrative law judges, Board cases were tried by trial
examiners.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 515.
88
Id. at 530.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 530-31.
82

294

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:2

sought to “modify or terminate” the contract, finding on the basis of a
purported admission at trial that it was the company which had sought a
modification.92 Furthermore, in the TE’s view, under Mastro Plastics “[t]he
notice requirements of Section 8(d)(1) and (3) do not apply . . . to every
economic strike,” and since this one, like the unfair labor practice strike in
Mastro Plastics, was not to “terminate or modify” the contract those
requirements did not apply here.93 On this basis, the TE found that the
strike was lawful, that the mass discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) and that
the company’s withdrawal of recognition violated Section 8(a)(5) as
alleged.94
Significantly, neither the General Counsel nor the union had chosen to
argue to the TE that Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision was not
applicable to a violation solely of Section 8(d)(3). For this reason, and
because the TE found that Section 8(d) was entirely inapplicable, the TE
did not need to address that issue. Although the company’s exceptions95
and briefs to the Board undoubtedly repeated its argument that the strikers
had lost their protected status as a matter of Section 8(d), they would
necessarily have focused primarily on refuting the TE’s findings.96 By the
same token, the General Counsel’s and the union’s briefs would have
concentrated on defending the TE’s findings and urging the Board to accept
his rationale. Although they must also have addressed the loss-of-status
provision, they would have done so only as a contingency argument in the
event the Board rejected the TE’s rationale. Their analyses of the
provision’s application would therefore have been comparatively
perfunctory at best. The significance of this is that if any analysis of the
loss-of-status provision of any depth was presented to the Board, it was
most likely the company’s. In all likelihood, the Board heard no extensive
argument from the General Counsel or the union of why the strikers should
92

Id. at 530-31, 531 n.12. In the TE’s view, the strike was intended “to force the
Respondent to abandon its insistence upon substantial changes in the contract,
particularly the ‘no vested rights’ clause,” and “[a]lthough the union's position on May
31 was that it would renew the old contract with the two changes already agreed to, it
cannot seriously be contended that it struck to obtain these two minor changes. A union
does not strike to obtain terms to which the employer has already agreed.” Id. at 531
and n.14.
93
Id. at 531.
94
Id. at 531, 53.
95
A party dissatisfied with a TE’s (or ALJ’s) decision in a Board case has the option of
filing “exceptions” – the equivalent of an appeal – with a supporting brief on the
disputed issue[s] with the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 102.46
(2006); 29 C.F.R. 101.11(b) (2006). In the absence of exceptions filed within 28 days
after an ALJ issues a decision, the ALJ’s decision becomes final. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a)
(2006).
96
The NLRB reports that the agency’s case files for Fort Smith, including the parties’
briefs, no longer exist and were not electronically recorded.
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not be deprived of the Act’s protection.
The case, on exception, was heard by the full Board—i.e., by a panel
consisting of all five of its members. This reflected their recognition that
the case was important.97 The decision, however, was not unanimous, and
with respect to the loss-of-status issue there was not even a binding
majority. As noted supra, a plurality of two members—Philip Rogers and
Boyd Leedom—wrote the opinion which has been treated as the Fort Smith
“decision.”98 Chairman Frank McCulloch wrote an opinion concurring only
in part, without reaching the loss-of-status issue.99 Member Gerald Brown
wrote a personal footnote taking essentially the same position.100 The fifth
Member, John Fanning, dissented at length.101
The first oddity in the plurality opinion is that it put the cart before the
horse. Since the company relied on Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision,
that had to be the threshold issue in the case: if the Fort Smith strikers had
lost their status as protected “employees” under the Act, they could not
seek the Act’s protection against unlawful discharge under Section 8(a)(3)
and the Board did not need even to address that issue.102 Only if the strikers
were found not to have lost their protected status would it be necessary to
decide whether their discharges were unlawfully motivated. The plurality,
however, reversed this order.
The plurality first rejected the TE’s finding that the company rather than
the union had sought to “terminate or modify” the parties’ contract within
the meaning of Section 8(d). The union was consequently subject to the
requirements of Section 8(d)(3).103 The plurality also found that Mastro
Plastics was not applicable, because the TE had correctly found that the
company had not bargained in bad faith. The strike was accordingly an
economic strike in support of the union’s desired contract changes, not an
unfair labor practice strike.104 Since the union had undisputedly failed to
send a notice to the FMCS, the strike was unlawful under Section
8(d)(4).105
This much was unobjectionable. The TE’s findings that the union did not
97

The Board consists of five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). However, as authorized by the Act, The Board
decides the vast majority of its cases by three-Member panels. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(b)
(2012).
98
Fort Smith Chair Co, 143 N.L.R.B. at 514.
99
Id. at 520.
100
Id. at 535 n.10.
101
Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 521.
102
Like a court or any adjudicatory body, the Board usually declines to reach fact or
legal issues that it does not need to address in order to resolve the case.
103
Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 516-17.
104
Id. at 517.
105
Id.
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come under Section 8(d)(3)’s notice obligation and that the strike was
exempt from Section 8(d) restrictions could only be described as a
contortion of the facts. The TE—like the General Counsel and the union—
clearly had wanted to avoid having to deal with the loss-of-status issue.
Then, however, instead of addressing the strikers’ protected employee
status, the plurality jumped to the unlawful-discrimination allegation and to
what is usually the key element of a discrimination case: the company’s
motive for discharging the strikers. “As we have found the June 1 strike to
be unlawful, the Respondent could, as it contends it did, lawfully discharge
employees because they engaged in the strike.”106 The plurality took note
of the General Counsel’s contention that “the real reason for discharging
the strikers was not the strike but the desire of the Respondent to rid itself
of the union.”107 This contention was based on the testimony by a company
official that his decision to discharge the strikers was motivated by “the
Respondent's financial difficulties, the Respondent's difficulty in obtaining
changes in working conditions, the union's harassment of Respondent
through the filing of grievances, and the union's uncompromising
attitude.”108 To the plurality, however, this was no indication of unlawful
motive.
[T]his is no more than a formulation of the background against
which the Respondent decided to exercise its lawful right to
discharge its employees for engaging in an unlawful strike. It falls
short of being an admission of illegal motivation. Given a valid
reason, as here, for discharging its employees and the fact that this
reason was set forth in the Respondent's letter to these employees
shortly after Respondent learned of the noncompliance with
Section 8(d), there is ample basis on the entire record for
concluding, as we do here, that employee participation in the
unlawful strike was the real reason for the discharge.109
This interpretation of the facts was highly slanted. By 1963 it was
already well established in Board law that an employer—regardless of the
employer’s “financial condition” or its “difficulty” in dealing with an
“uncompromising” union—did not have to agree to any bargaining
proposal and could even engage in a lockout to impose its own bargaining

106

Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
107
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position.110 It was elementary, however, that such “difficulties” in
bargaining do not create a legal justification for attempting to oust the
union by coercive means. At the very least, problems of “financial
condition” and difficult bargaining do not establish that the employer’s sole
motivation is to punish an unlawful strike, as the plurality chose to assume.
But at least this finding of lawful motive was not a statement of law that
would apply in the future. It left open the possibility that in similar cases
the General Counsel could show that the employer’s real motive was to rid
itself of the union and was therefore unlawful.111
Here the plurality might have stopped, at least as far as the mass
discharge was concerned. Its finding that the company’s motive was lawful
negated the General Counsel’s 8(a)(3) allegation and established (at least to
the plurality’s satisfaction) that the strikers had been lawfully discharged.
This made it unnecessary to decide whether their protected status had been
affected by the union’s 8(d)(3) infraction. The only issue that still had to be
resolved was the union’s representative status after the mass discharge. But
the plurality chose to ignore the finding it had just made as not “relevant”
and to address the issue that should have come first: had the strikers, by
their action, lost the protection of the Act? The answer, in the plurality’s
view, was yes.
Moreover, apart from the foregoing, we find that the
Respondent's motive in discharging the strikers is not a relevant
consideration. The strike here was an unlawful, and not merely an
unprotected, activity [citing California Ass., 109 N.L.R.B. 754, and
Local 219, Retail Clerks v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
enforcing Carroll House of Bellville, supra], and by engaging in
such a strike, the employees “forfeited their rights to protection of
the Act.” [Citing Mackay Radio, 96 NLRB 740, 742-743 (1951).]
To hold otherwise would, in effect, protect the strikers in their
unlawful conduct, a result clearly in collision with the Board's

110

NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, Intern. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87,
92-3 (1957) (lockout); NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402
(1952) (no requirement to accept).
111
Under long-standing Board law, even where a lawful basis is found to have existed
for an employer’s disciplinary action, this will not preclude a finding that the discipline
was unlawful if the General Counsel establishes that the employer acted with unlawful
animus and the employer fails to show that it was actually motivated by the lawful
basis. E.g., La Gloria Oil and Gas, 337 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1123 (2002), aff’d. 71 Fed.
Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (Table); Stemilt Growers, 336 N.L.R.B. 987, 990 (2001);
Robbins Tire and Rubber, 69 N.L.R.B. 440, 441 n.21 (1946), enf’d, 161 F.2d 798 (5th
Cir. 1947); Eagle-Pitcher Mining & Smelting, 16 N.L.R.B. 727, 801 (1939, enf’d, 119
F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1941); Borden Mills, 13 N.L.R.B. 459, 474-75 (1939).
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responsibility to discourage such conduct.112
As noted above, California Ass’n., and Local 219, Retail Clerks, cited in
the above passage, had held that a strike following noncompliance with
Section 8(d)(3) was a violation of Section 8(b)(3). Those cases had not,
however, even addressed the application of Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status
provision. And Mackay Radio, the only authority the plurality cited for its
assertion that the strikers had “forfeited their rights to protection of the
Act,” did not rely on—or even cite—Section 8(d) or the loss-of-status
provision.113 Mackay Radio found that the union went on strike for the
specific purpose—with its members’ apparent knowledge and approval—of
obtaining unlawful contract provisions.114 Since that strike was “to compel
the Respondents to violate a clear congressional mandate,” the strikers
were held to have lost the Act’s protection.115 The Fort Smith plurality
proffered no reason why the loss-of-status sanction for a union’s and its
members’ knowing attempt to force an employer to accept unlawful
contract terms should also apply to a union’s negligent failure, unknown to
its members, to file a notice with the FMCS.
It was at the end of the Rogers-Leedom plurality’s passage quoted above
that Member Brown, not a member of the plurality, inserted a personal
footnote:
Agreeing with the majority that Respondent did not have a
discriminatory intent, Member Brown finds it unnecessary to
consider what the situation would be had Respondent's motive
been otherwise; and, in view of the specific language of Section
8(d), he also finds it unnecessary to rely on Mackay Radio . . . .116
This statement was not a model of clarity, but Member Brown was
unmistakably saying that it was not necessary for the Board to go beyond
finding that the company’s motive was lawful, and that he therefore
declined to do so. If the employer had been found to have a
“discriminatory” (i.e., unlawful) intent, the “situation would be” that the
lawfulness of the mass discharge depended entirely on whether the strikers
had lost protection under Section 8(d). Although Member Brown then
112

Fort Smith Chair Co. 143 N.L.R.B. at 518 (emphasis in original).
Although the union in Mackay Radio had failed to comply with the filing
requirements of then-Section 9(e) of the Act, which required unions to file noncommunist affidavits, noncompliance with Section 8(d) was not an issue in the case.
See 96 N.L.R.B. 740, 741, 745 n.18, 749 n.3, (1951).
114
Id. at 741-42 n.7, 753-54, 761.
115
Id. at 741-43.
116
Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 518 n.10.
113
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referred to Section 8(d), this was solely (given what he had just said) to
point out that in any event Mackay Radio could have no bearing on the
case.117
The plurality continued, however, acknowledging the glaring
contradiction that it could not ignore: the loss-of-status provision, by its
terms, referred only to “the sixty-day period specified in [Section 8(d)(1)
and (4)],” and not to the thirty-day notification period in Section 8(d)(3);
and the union had complied with Section 8(d)(1) by sending timely notice
to the company.118 In the plurality’s view, however, this did not matter.
[T]o give such a literal construction of the waiting period to the
loss-of-status provision is to wrench it from the rest of Section 8(d)
. . . . [T]he section must be interpreted in light of the dual purposes
of the Act to protect concerted activities and to substitute collective
bargaining for economic warfare . . . . While subsections (1)
through (4) place certain obligations upon the contractual parties in
order to assure that bargaining and mediation can proceed for a
reasonable time free from direct economic pressures, the loss-ofstatus provision, in effect, places an obligation upon employees for
the same purpose. Consequently, it seems obvious to us that the
various parts of Section 8(d) here involved must be read together
in order to create an effective and consistent statutory means for
achieving the purpose of the section.119
The plurality cited the Board’s prior holdings that a union sending late
notice to the FMCS is required to wait the full thirty days before striking,
even if that period extends beyond the sixty-day period following the
required 8(d)(1) notice to the employer.120 To the plurality, the sixty-day
period referred to in the loss-of-status provision “requires the same
interpretation to protect the period for mediation.”121 Moreover, “the
statutory language suggests no basis for concluding that the similarly
worded waiting periods of Section 8(d) should vary from clause to clause .
. . .”122 By this, the plurality apparently meant that there was no difference
between “sixty days” and “thirty days.” Accordingly, the plurality
concluded that the loss-of-status provision applied to violations not only of
Section 8(d)(1) and (4) but also of Section 8(d)(3), and that the Fort Smith
117

Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 518.
119
Id. at 518-519.
120
Id. at 519 (citing California Ass’n. of Employers, and Retail Clerks v. NLRB, 265
F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
121
Id.
122
Id. (emphasis added).
118
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strikers had lost the Act’s protection.123 “[C]onsequently, such motive as
may have been behind the Respondent's actions with respect to them is
immaterial.”124
Finally, the plurality found that since the strikers had been lawfully
discharged, their bargaining unit no longer existed. The employer therefore
acted lawfully in withdrawing recognition from the union.125
Chairman McCulloch filed a separate concurrence, agreeing that the
strike was unlawful due to the 8(d)(3) infraction “and as such was an
unprotected concerted activity for which the employees could validly be
discharged.”126 He also agreed that the mass discharge was not “in truth
motivated by any other consideration.”127 But he also agreed with Member
Brown that there was no need to address Section 8(d).
Hence, like Member Brown, I find it unnecessary to determine
what the situation might have been had the record established
discriminatory motivation on some other basis. Nor do I find it
necessary now to pass on the question of whether the employee
“loss of status” penalty provision contained in the final sentence of
Section 8(d) is applicable in the case of a strike preceded by
compliance with the 8(d)(1) 60-day notice requirement but not by
compliance with the notice requirement of Section 8(d)(3). The
unprotected activity ground adverted to above is enough, without
more, to support the dismissal order in which I join.128
In short, two Board Members had joined the plurality in finding that the
Employer acted with lawful motivation, but not in reaching the impact of
Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision on the strikers.129
123

Id.
Id at 518-19.
125
Id. at 520. At the time Fort Smith was decided, there was authority for the
presumption that striker replacements did not support the union and that the employer,
having replaced the strikers, therefore had the right to withdraw recognition. See NLRB
v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 262 (1939); Titan Metal Manufacturing,
135 N.L.R.B. 196, 215 (1962); Jackson Manufacturing, 129 N.L.R.B. 460, 478 (1960);
Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1444 (1959); Marathon Electric
Manufacturing, 106 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1180-82 (1953), aff’d sub nom. United Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied 350 U.S. 981 (1956).
126
Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 520.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 520-21.
129
In fact, although this is not legally significant, the Fort Smith plurality opinion
shared three strangely analogous features with the Supreme Court’s notorious Dred
Scott decision of 1856. First, the opinion that was subsequently treated as the Dred
Scott decision was similarly not issued by a majority. Second, the Court, after deciding
124
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It was left to the lone dissenter, Member Fanning, to point out the
fallacies in the plurality’s “strained construction” of that issue.130 He noted
that the loss-of-status provision’s explicit reference to the 60-day period
specified in Section 8(d)(1) and (4) “was not the result of happenstance”
but of compromise, given that the provision’s Congressional opponents had
opposed the provision altogether, arguing that no restriction on the right to
strike was justified.131 The provision’s legislative history, he emphasized,
“is literally punctuated with the equation of ‘loss of status’ to that [the
sixty-day] period.”132
Moreover, Member Fanning continued, citing the Act’s dual purpose of
protecting concerted activities and encouraging collective bargaining, the
Supreme Court had already laid down that “[a] construction which serves
neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen
clearly compel it.”133 In conjunction with this he cited Section 13’s
emphatic admonition that “[n]othing in this Act, except as specifically
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right.”134
I believe that a limitation on the right of employees to strike
which goes beyond the 60-day period specified in Section 8(d)(1)
and (4) must be more explicit and clear before it can be said to
have been intromitted in Section 8(d)(3). For, under my colleagues'
“parity of reasoning,” the failure of a union to notify the [FMCS] .
. . may result in the forfeiture of the right to strike for weeks, or
months, or even years after that period has elapsed. In my opinion,
such a construction throws the concerted rights of employees into
imbalance under the statutory scheme, and does little if anything to
enhance true collective bargaining.135
an issue that was entirely dispositive of the case, reached out to decide an additional
issue it had no need to reach. Third, and most important, in seizing on that additional
issue the Court severely injured many innocent people. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856) (the Court, after deciding that the plaintiff, an African American, had
no right to sue in court, went on to hold that the Missouri Compromise, in which
Congress prohibited slavery in U.S territories, was unconstitutional).
130
Fort Smith Chair Co., 143 N.L.R.B. at 521-26.
131
Id. at 523.
132
Id. See also notes 51-55 and related text.
133
Id. at 524 (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil, 352 U.S. 282, 289 (1957)).
134
Id. (emphasis by Member Fanning).
135
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963)) (“While
Congress has from time to time revamped and redirected national labor policy, its
concern for the integrity of the strike weapon has remained constant. Thus when
Congress chose to qualify the use of the strike, it did so by prescribing the limits and
conditions of the abridgement in exacting detail, e.g., Sections 8(b)(4), 8(d) [of the
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In short, Member Fanning concluded, “[i]f Congress has sought to relate
the ‘loss-of-status’ provision to each and every notice clause in Section
8(d), it could readily have done so. It has not.”136
Finally, quite apart from Section 8(d), Member Fanning pointed out that
the plurality had cited no applicable authority for concluding that the
strikers could lawfully be fired, or even that the 8(d)(3) infraction made
their strike unlawful.137 This was not a case where a strike violated a nostrike agreement or was called to compel an employer to violate the Act—
the respective situations in Budd Electronics, and Mackay Radio, on which
the plurality relied.138 Nor did the strike violate Section 8(d)(4), which was
also limited by its terms to the sixty-day period for notice to employers
specified in Section 8(d)(1).
Here, the employees struck, not in furtherance of the union's
failure to give the 30-day notice under Section 8(d)(3), but to exert
economic pressure upon Respondent to obtain a lawful collectivebargaining agreement. Their strike was therefore totally unrelated
to their union's violation of that section. I fail to perceive how such
a strike acquired a taint of illegality or how the employees'
otherwise lawful conduct can be translated into unprotected
concerted activity. If my colleagues' assertion is pressed to its
logical conclusion, then all employee strike action, regardless of
how lawful its object or purpose, becomes unprotected whenever
Act], by indicating the precise procedures to be followed in effecting the interference . .
. .”); id. n.24.
136
Id. at 524-25 (citing Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble, 312 F. 2d 181, 188
(C.A. 2 1962)) (describing how the court in Procter & Gamble had rejected a union’s
contention that its own delay in filing an 8(d)(3) notice with the FMCS effectively
extended the contract beyond its expiration date: “[T]he requirement of paragraph (3)
[in Section 8(d)] that federal and state agencies be notified is entirely independent of
paragraph (4). There is no suggestion in the text that a failure to meet the notice
requirements of paragraph (3) will have any effect on paragraph (4). The only notice
mentioned in (4) is the 60-day notice of termination.”). Justice Frankfurter, in his
concurrence in NLRB v. Lion Oil, had similarly correlated the loss-of-status provision
specifically to Sec. 8(d)’s 60-day notice to the employer and no-strike requirements.
See 352 U.S. at 303.
137
143 N.L.R.B. at 526. With respect to whether the strike itself was unlawful, Member
Fanning implicitly disagreed with California Ass., Broward Builders Exchange, and
Carrol House of Bellville, which had found to the contrary. However, whether he was
right or wrong in that respect, the point was separate from the strikers’ loss of status as
protected employees. I.e., if the strikers retained their status as employees protected by
the Act, even if their strike was unlawful they could be found unlawfully discharged
under Sec. 8(a)(3) if the company’s motive was shown to be to rid itself of the union.
138
E.g. Budd Electronics, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 498 (1962); Mackay Radio and Telegraph
Company, Inc. 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951).
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their union concurrently violates the Act.139
Member Fanning concluded that the Fort Smith strikers had not lost the
Act’s protection, that their strike was lawful, that the company
consequently had fired them in violation of Section 8(a)(3) in retaliation for
engaging in protected activity, that the union consequently retained its
majority representative status, and that the company was obligated to
bargain with them once the union complied with Section 8(d)(3).140
It may be noted, in addition to the points made by Member Fanning, that
the plurality ignored the Board’s earlier categorical statement in Lion
Oil,141 echoed in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence on review, that Section
8(d)’s loss-of-status provision, “by its terms . . . applies only to those
employees who strike within the sixty-day period specified by the
statute.”142 Nor did the plurality address the significance of Congress’s
varying use of “written notice” in Section 8(d)(1) and “notifies” in Section
8(d)(3). Nor, most important, did the plurality explain how holding strikers
who were not even aware of their union’s negligent infraction of Section
8(d)(3) responsible for the error and subjecting them to mass discharge
would prevent such negligence in the future.
On appeal by the union, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the plurality’s opinion.143 The court rejected the
union’s contention—still its primary argument—that it was the company
rather than the union which had been obligated to file notice with the
FMCS.144 And the court agreed with the Board majority’s determination
that the company acted with a lawful motive in firing the strikers, finding
that “this determination has adequate support in the record.”145
Significantly, however, the court noted that the plurality opinion on loss of
protected status under Section 8(d) represented the votes of only two Board
members and, like Chairman McCulloch and Member Brown, the court
explicitly declined to reach that issue.146
In short, a plurality of two Board members out of five had opined that
Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision applied to strikers in situations
139

143 NLRB at 526. Member Fanning also noted that while California Ass. of
Employers, , and Retail Clerks Local 219, also relied on by the plurality, found that a
union violated Section 8(b)(3) by failing to comply with Section 8(d)(3), neither case
referred to the loss-of-status provision or implied that it was applicable. Id. at 526 n.28.
140
Id.
141
352 U.S. at 289, 296.
142
United Packinghouse Workers (Wilson & Co.), 89 N.L.R.B. 310, 314 (emphasis in
original).
143
United Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738, 742.
144
Id. at 741-42.
145
Id. at 742.
146
Id. at n.3.
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where the only violation of the law committed, unknown to them, was their
union’s failure to comply with Section 8(d)(3). Their three colleagues and
the reviewing court of appeals had categorically refused to endorse this
position. As an institutional matter, since only two of the five voting Board
Members had joined the plurality opinion with respect to Section 8(d), that
opinion did not express a Board majority’s view and therefore was not a
statement of law with binding precedential authority in subsequent cases.147
Moreover, as Member Fanning had cogently pointed out, the plurality
opinion had no support in the Taft-Hartley Act or its legislative history,
flew in the face of Section 13’s injunction against impeding the right to
strike “except as specifically provided for herein,” and flatly ignored the
Court’s affirmation in Lion Oil that the loss-of-status provision applied
only to 8(d)(1) infractions.
The plurality’s position was also completely unproductive in the light of
its own justification for depriving strikers of protection for their union’s
8(d)(3) infraction. As indicated supra, that justification was that (1) not to
do so would violate the Board’s duty to discourage “unlawful conduct;”
and (2) “in order to assure that bargaining and mediation can proceed for a
reasonable time free from direct economic pressures.”148 But the deterrent
purpose behind punitive sanctions is premised on misconduct that is
intentional. Where workers go on strike in complete ignorance of an
8(d)(3) infraction which their union had no intention of committing, how
would treating the strikers as wrongdoers after the fact deter other unions
from committing the same negligent mistake in the future? How does firing
the strikers en masse and obliterating their bargaining unit—leaving their
employer conveniently free of any future bargaining obligation—deter
“unlawful conduct” or encourage 8(d)(3) compliance, collective
bargaining, resolution by mediation, or the flow of commerce?
As noted above, the plurality left this unanswered. But the only possible
rationale it could have posited was that the extremity of such a known

147

See Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 389-90 (1991) (noting that the
plurality opinion and the two other opinions in Otis Elevator, 269 NLRB 891 (1984)
each “retain[ed] vitality” but that “no single opinion has commanded the support of the
majority of the Board”), enf’d in part, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 511
U.S. 1138 (1994); see also Hacienda Resort Hotel and Casino, 355 N.L.R.B. 742, 743
n.1 (2010) (Chairman Liebman and Member Pearce, concurring) (“[i]t is the tradition
of the Board that the power to overrule precedent will be exercised only by a threemember majority of the Board.”); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635
(2010) (establishing that Sec. 3(b) of NLRA requires the Board to have a quorum of at
least three sitting Members to issue decisions). Although Hacienda Resort and New
Process Steel do not address the authority of a plurality opinion, they strongly suggest
what is intuitively obvious: a majority of any Board panel, whatever its size, is required
to make affirmative Board law with precedential authority.
148
143 N.L.R.B. at 518-19.
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sanction would motivate every union to be mindful of the FMCS filing
requirement and to comply with it unfailingly, giving the FMCS a chance
to intervene.149 This was not only unacceptably draconian but contrary to
the entire thrust of the NLRA. If workers had the right to engage in
concerted activity to improve their terms of employment, they had the even
more elementary right to not be treated as expendable pawns for the
purpose of enforcing a second-party reporting requirement to a third-party
agency which there was no reason to assume they had ever heard of. As the
Court had emphasized in Lion Oil, given the “dual purpose in the TaftHartley Act—to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and
to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their
own benefit . . . [a] construction which serves neither of these aims is to be
avoided unless the words Congress has chosen clearly compel it.”150
Yet from its issuance—but without any subsequent analysis that could be
considered an independent affirmation by a Board majority—the Board and
the courts have indeed treated Fort Smith as binding and correct. From
1963 to 1974, in at least two reported cases summarily relying on Fort
Smith, strikers were fired and treated as unprotected by their unions’ failure
to send timely notice of dispute to the FMCS or to an analogous state
agency.151
Then Congress decided it was time to amend the Act.
III. CONGRESS EXTENDS THE ACT TO NONPROFIT HOSPITALS
A. The Health Care Amendments
In 1974, for the first time since Taft-Hartley, Congress enacted a
significant extension of the Act’s coverage to additional employees. This
legislation, commonly referred to as the 1974 Health Care Amendments to
the NLRA,152 extended the Act’s protection to the employees of private
nonprofit hospitals and other private nonprofit health-care institutions. It
was necessary because the Taft-Hartley Act, in 1947, had specifically
excluded those employers from the Wagner Act’s definition of

149

It clearly made no difference to the plurality that on this occasion the FMCS had in
fact been made aware of the Fort Smith dispute, was represented at negotiations, and
had an opportunity to influence the outcome.
150
352 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added).
151
United Mine Workers (McCoy Coal Co.), 165 N.L.R.B. 592 (1967); Publicity
Engravers, 161 N.L.R.B. 221 (1966); see also Texaco, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 989 (1969)
(relying on Fort Smith with respect to violations of Sec. 8(d)(1)).
152
Public Law 93-360, July 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 395.
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“employer.”153 The absence of a regulatory framework for authorizing
representation and resolving labor-management disputes in this sector had
resulted in the increasing disruption of institutionalized health care due to
recognition or economic strikes at nonprofit hospitals, just as it had in the
rest of the private sector before the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.154
The Health Care Amendments eliminated this exclusion and defined a
covered “health care institution” as any nonpublic “institution devoted to
the care of sick, infirm, or aged person.”155 This effectively gave healthcare employees the same rights to organize and engage in protected
concerted activity under Section 7 enjoyed by most other private-sector
workers. However, out of concern that strikes at hospitals might deprive
patients of vitally needed care, Congress added additional requirements to
Section 8(d) specifically for health-care institutions. As discussed below,
these included earlier notice to the opposite collective-bargaining party and
to the FMCS than were already imposed on other employers by Section
8(d).156 In addition, where the union was bargaining for an initial agreement
with a health employer it was required to give separate notice to the FMCS
of intent to strike at least thirty days in advance.157 In contract modification
or renegotiation situations, a new subsection 8(g) required the union to give
ten days written notice to both the health-care employer and to the FMCS
153

Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Public Law 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 137; Sec.
2(2).
154
H. Report No. 93-1051, Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the NLRA, House
Committee on Education and Labor, May 20, 1974, at 4-5; Legislative History of
Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act, 1974, Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, at 272-73.
155
29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (14) (2006).
156
The language pertaining to notice that was added at the end of Sec. 8(d) by the
Health Care Amendments, in its entirety, was as follows (emphasis added):
Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the
provisions of this section 8(d) [this subsection] shall be modified as follows:
(A) The notice of section 8(d)(1) [paragraph (1) of this subsection] shall be ninety days;
the notice of section 8(d)(3) [paragraph (3) of this subsection] shall be sixty days; and
the contract period of section 8(d)(4) [paragraph (4) of this subsection] shall be ninety
days.
(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or
recognition, at least thirty days' notice of the existence of a dispute shall be given by
the labor organization to the agencies set forth in section 8(d)(3) [in paragraph (3) of
this subsection].
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either
clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the
parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to
agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be
undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute. Pub.
L. 93-360, July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395, 396; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added).
157
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(B) (2006).
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in advance of any strike.158 An additional section authorized the Director of
the FMCS to appoint a board of inquiry to investigate and report
concerning any labor dispute that might “substantially interrupt” the
delivery of health care.159 None of these amendments affected workers
outside the health-care sector.
But the Health Care Amendments made one other significant change
to Section 8(d)—specifically to the loss-of-employee-status provision.
While the original provision stated that “[a]ny employee who engages in a
strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his
status as an employee,” the provision as revised in 1974 stated that “[a]ny
employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this
subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period
specified in subsection (g) . . . shall lose his status as an employee.”160
This change in text was not, like the others, limited by its terms to the
health-care sector. And “any notice period specified in this subsection,”
unlike the former “sixty-day period,” would arguably include the
applicable notice period in Section 8(d)(3) with respect to non-health-care
employees, not just employees in health care. That is, this change, at least
taken literally, applied the loss-of-status provision as the Fort Smith
plurality had applied it to workers outside health care—not only to a
union’s failure to provide sixty days’ notice to an employer in advance of
contract expiration in compliance with Section 8(d)(1), but also to the
failure to give notice to the FMCS “within 30 days after such notice” in
compliance with Section 8(d)(3).
The textual changes made by the Health Care Amendments make it clear
that Congress, in view of the life-threatening implications of work
stoppages in health-care facilities, intended to impose Section 8(d)’s lossof-status sanction as a penalty on health-care strikers whose unions failed
to comply with Section 8(d)(3). But did Congress, by this change, also
intend to ratify and legislate Fort Smith’s interpretation of the law for all
other employees subject to the Act? Did Congress intend merely to defer to
the Board’s interpretation of the law for workers outside health care, as
expressed in Fort Smith, without barring the agency from subsequently
changing that interpretation? Or did Congress even intend to legislate at all
with respect to those workers? Only if it did were those workers affected.

158

29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (2006).
29 U.S.C. §183(a) (2006).
160
88 Stat. 395; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (emphasis added). The loss-of-status provision was
also amended to apply specifically to violations of the new 10-day notice requirements
in advance of health-care strikes in the new Section 8(g).
159
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B. Congress’s Intent – For Workers Outside Health Care
1. How to Interpret the Amendments?
The established framework for interpreting an act of Congress is
deceptively simple. First a court (or an agency) looks to the statutory text at
issue and the text surrounding it to determine whether the intent is clearly
expressed in the statute itself. If it is, the inquiry is over;161 if not, the court
looks to the statute’s legislative history.162
However, there are notable exceptions with respect to both prescribed
steps. Although clear statutory language will often be dispositive,
“ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need
not end the inquiry . . . . The circumstances of the enactment of particular
legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of
common meaning to have their literal effect.”163
For that matter, the Supreme Court has categorically stated, “[t]he
definition of words in isolation . . . is not necessarily controlling in
statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not extend to the
outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”164 More to the point, as the
Supreme Court observed in United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns.,165
when a literal interpretation of statutory language “has led to absurd or
futile results . . . this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of
the act . . . . Even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results
but merely an unreasonable one plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the
literal words.”166
161

E.g., Bedroc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004); United
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986).
162
E.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 253-54 (1979).
163
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); see also id. at n.9 (citing Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945))
(“Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary,
and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it
a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”).
164
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or
phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and
context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the
analysis.”).
165
310 U.S. 534 (1940).
166
Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted). Judge Learned Hand put it even more
succinctly: “[t]he duty of ascertaining [the] meaning [of a statute] is difficult at best,
and one certain way of missing it is by reading it literally . . . .” General Service
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In National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB,167 The Court made
the same observation it made in American Trucking Ass’ns. with respect to
sections of the NLRA other than Section 8(d):
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit
nor within the intention of its makers. That principle has particular
application in the construction of labor legislation which is to a
marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between
strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of
organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the
appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of
management and labor to further their respective interests.168
Moreover, and significantly with respect to the Health Care
Amendments, caution in applying statutory wording literally is particularly
warranted where Congress clearly did not focus on the particular issue in
dispute. Where an issue was the direct subject of Congressional discussion
and the resulting statutory language is the direct result of that
consideration, it may fairly be assumed that the language was carefully
chosen to reflect the legislative will.169 By contrast, where the question at
issue was not even addressed, the literal meaning of the statutory language
is not necessarily dispositive.170
Of course, such exceptions are anathema to the “textualist” school of
statutory interpretation, whose adherents refuse (purportedly always and
without bias) to look beyond a statute’s text regardless of the interpretive
consequences. The supplementary interpretive step of consulting legislative
history where statutory language is not clearly dispositive has come under

Employees Local 73 v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 361, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting speech to
Massachusetts Bar Ass’n.).
167
386 U.S. 612 (1967).
168
Id. at 619 (1967) (interpreting Sec. 8(e) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72
(1964) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns., 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940)) (interpreting Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
169
See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1980) (the phrase “and laws,” which
was inserted into the legislation that became 42 U.S.C. § 1983, should be interpreted
literally to mean all rather than a subset of laws, because “Congress’ attention was
specifically directed to this new language . . . [and] was aware of what it was doing”);
United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871, 875 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Cases construing changes
in statutory language tend to rely in part on evidence of congressional intent or at least
attention to the change in deciding whether to give the change its literal effect”)
(emphasis added), and authorities cited therein.
170
United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871, 875 (1982).
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increasing challenge from this quarter in recent years.171 However, without
becoming immersed in that controversy here, it seems safe to observe that
the best way to interpret a particular clause in a particular statute would be
highly individual to the statute, its background, and the dispute at issue.172
Moreover, few would dispute that the authority of a legislative history, if
not dispositive, could at least be increased or reduced by the closeness or
distance between the issue in dispute and the declared subject of the
legislation.
In this instance, however, a fruitful analysis can be made solely of the
textual change the Health Care Amendments made in the loss-of-status
provision, even before consulting their legislative history.
2. “Any Notice Period” – The Text
Why would “any notice period specified in this subsection,” as it was
drafted in the 1974 amendment to Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision,
not have referred to every single notice period specified in Section 8(d),
including Section 8(d)(3)’s FMCS notification requirement as applied to
workers outside health care? Or, why would “any,” as used in Section 8(d),
not always mean any?
First, because the Supreme Court has already said it doesn’t, if
indirectly. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,173 as noted above, the Court
found that Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision did not apply to unfair
labor practice strikes. This was so even though the provision applied by its
terms to “any” employee who engaged in “a strike”—i.e., to any strike—
within the sixty-day notice period specified in Sections 8(d)(1) and (4). To
hold otherwise, the Court observed, would be to read the words of the
provision “in complete isolation from their context in the Act.”174
Furthermore, noting that the distinction between economic strikes and
171

See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 30-35 (1997); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-101 (2005); D. O’Gorman, Construing the NLRA: the
NLRB and Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 191-205 (2008)
(reviewing the textualist-vs.-intentionalist debate with respect to the NLRB and other
federal agencies).
172
See also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (J. Stevens
dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (“[T]he ‘minimalist judge’ who holds that ‘the
purpose of the statute may be learned only from its language’ has more discretion than
the judge who will seek guidance from every reliable source. A method of statutory
interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a
result that is consistent with a court's own views of how things should be, but it may
also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted.”).
173
350 U.S. 270 (1956).
174
350 U.S. at 285.
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unfair labor practice strikes pre-existed Taft-Hartley, the Court observed
that Congress could have eliminated that distinction but “[could] not fairly
be held to have made such an intrusion on employees’ rights . . . without
some more explicit expression of its purpose to do so than appears here.”175
In addition, since the strike at issue in Mastro Plastics had occurred
during the term of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, the Court
had to construe the contract’s ban on “any strike or work stoppage.” 176 The
Court found that the contract “dealt solely with the [parties’] economic
relationship” and was intended to prohibit economic strikes, not unfair
labor practice strikes; and consequently that the strike at issue did not
violate the prohibition notwithstanding its reference to “any” strike.177 The
Mastro Plastics Court, in short, refused to interpret “any” literally in two
different wording contexts—one of them the loss-of-status provision itself
related to strikes.178 Although not dispositive, this answers our opening
question, even though Mastro Plastics did not specifically address “any
notice period” in the loss-of-status provision: “any” does not always mean
literally any or “every” in Section 8(d)(1), and the mere fact of Congress’s
having used the word in referring to the section’s notice periods is not
dispositive.
Moreover, for the same reasons that the Fort Smith plurality opinion was
misguided (and consistent with the Mastro Plastics holding), a literal
interpretation of “any notice period specified in this sub-section,” as it now
appears in the loss-of-status provision, defeats the NLRA’s dual purpose: to
protect the flow of commerce while encouraging collective bargaining.
Perpetuating the Fort Smith approach to labor relations by interpreting “any
notice period” literally leads precisely to the “absurd or futile result . . .
plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,” which the
Supreme Court warned against in American Trucking Ass’ns.179 And the
remaining text of the Health Care Amendments not only does not require
such an interpretation but militates against it.
3. The Surrounding Text
A more restrictive reading of “any notice period” is warranted not only
175

Id. at 288-289.
Id. at 281.
177
Id. at 281-282.
178
Cf. Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004) (interpreting
“any” not to include political subdivisions of a state); Raygor v. Regents of University
of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 542-46 (2002) (“any” interpreted not to include claims
against states so as to effectively extend state statute of limitations); Falvey, 676 F.2d at
875 (interpreting “any” not to include coins not used as U.S. currency); Nixon, 541
U.S. at 132 (“[A]ny can and does mean different things depending upon the setting.”).
179
310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
176
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as a matter of NLRA policy but by the clearly limited purpose of the Health
Care Amendments themselves: to extend the coverage of the NLRA to
health-care employers and workers. The entire text of the amendments, by
itself, confirms that Congress had no thought of affecting the Act’s
application to workers outside health care, who were seen to constitute an
entirely different category of employees. And this concentrated focus
solely on the health-care sector makes it easier to understand why Congress
used the phrase “any notice period specified in this sub-section,” which at
first glance seems to include Section 8(d)(3) as applied to workers outside
health care, without intending that inclusion.
The Health Care Amendments inserted four additional notice periods
into Section 8(d), each applicable by its terms only to health-care
institutions.180 This more than doubled the total number of required waiting
periods prescribed in Section 8(d) from three to seven. As noted above,
Congress clearly did intend to apply the loss-of-status provision to strikes
by health-care workers and their unions in violation of any of these new
notice requirements, given the “unique” features of their industry. In
addition, in view of its pre-1974 wording, the loss-of-status provision was
clearly intended to continue to apply to any strike outside health care in
violation of Section 8(d)(1)’s requirement of 60 days’ notice to the
employer. But this did not mean that Congress was endorsing Fort Smith,
or that it intended to apply the loss-of-status provision to workers outside
health care for their unions’ negligent violations of Section 8(d)(3).
It can certainly be argued that if Congress did not have that intent it
could have made this more explicit. The drafters of the Health Care
Amendments might have affirmatively listed each of the notice
requirements Congress meant to include in the amended loss-of-status
provision (just as the original 1947 provision had specified “the sixty-day
notice period”), including Section 8(d)(3)’s notification period as it applied
to health-care workers. The reason why the drafters’ failure to do this is not
dispositive is that it was obviously more convenient to state simply that the
loss-of-status provision would now apply to “any notice period specified in
this subsection.”181 Congress, like any legislative body, favors economy of
verbiage in the drafting of statutory language. It was easy to overlook that
this summary phrase, by its literal terms, would cover non-health as well as
health-care workers, because this change was the only provision in the
entire text of the Health Care Amendments of that nature: all of the other
amendments, without exception, were explicitly limited by their terms to
180

29 U.S.C § 8(d)(A) - (B).
The new requirement of 10 days’ notice to the employer and to the FMCS before a
health-care strike had to be referenced specifically in the loss-of-status provision
because that requirement was added in the new and separate sub-section 8(g). 29
U.S.C. §158(g) (2006).
181
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health care.182 And it was just as easy to continue to overlook the
unintended (and indirect) reference to workers outside health care from the
bill’s drafting all the way through final passage of the legislation because,
as demonstrated below, no one in Congress was even thinking about those
workers at the time.183
Another textual reason not to interpret “any” literally in this case is the
pre-existing divergence in wording between Section 8(d)’s notice
requirements. As noted supra, Section 8(d)(1) requires a union to give
“written notice” of “sixty days” to the employer before contract expiration
if it seeks to renegotiate the contract,184 and the loss-of-status provision in
its original form referred specifically to Section 8(d)(1)’s “60-day notice
period.”185 Section 8(d)(3), by contrast, requires the union to “notif[y]” the
FMCS and analogous state agency “within thirty days after such [Section
8(d)(1)’s required] notice” of the dispute.186
Before 1974, as demonstrated supra, this was a powerful and possibly
dispositive distinction that should arguably have precluded the application
of the loss-of-status sanction to 8(d)(3) violations. The only notice
specifically characterized as a “notice” in the original Section 8(d) of 1947
was the sixty-day “notice” to the other collective-bargaining party required
in Section 8(d)(1) and referred to in Section 8(d)(3) and (4). Section
8(d)(3)’s additional requirement to “notif[y]” the FMCS within thirty days
182

Cf. Falvey, 676 F.2d at 875 (“The draftsman [of a different statute], we surmise,
merely sought to ‘clean up the language’—falling into the trap, as can easily occur
where statutory language is rephrased, of unintentionally suggesting a substantive
change.”) (emphasis added).
183
Nor would this have been the only drafting error found in the Health Care
Amendments’ revision of Sec. 8(d). In Sinai Hosp’l of Baltimore, Inc. v. Scearce, 561
F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1977) the Fourth Circuit recognized that by increasing the thirty-day
FMCS notification requirement in Section 8(d)(3) to sixty days in the case of healthcare institutions, Congress did not intend—as the amended requirement stated—to
require that notification to be made “within sixty days after such notice [i.e., the 90-day
notice to the health employer required by Section 8(d)(1)]” is given. A literal reading of
this “error in drafting” would have permitted the FMCS notification to be made only
thirty days before contract expiration, even though it was clearly the intent of Congress
to make that notice period at least sixty days. 561 F.2d at 549 n.2; see also Affiliated
Hosp.s of San Francisco v. Scearce, 583 F.2d 1097, 1098 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (agreeing
with the Fourth Circuit that this was a “drafting error”); Trinity Lutheran Hospital, 218
N.L.R.B. 199 (1975) (Health Care Amendments require “60 days’ notice” to the FMCS
before contract expiration). Cf. Mammoth Coal, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 159, slip op. at 5
n.17 (2012) (Board’s previous statement, in Toering Electric, 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 233
(2007), that a particular showing requirement for the General Counsel applied to “all”
hiring discrimination cases “was obviously an unintentional overstatement,” since the
Board had previously held otherwise).
184
29 U.S.C § 158(d)(1) (emphasis added).
185
61 Stat. 136, 143 (emphasis added).
186
61 Stat. 136, 142; 29 U.S.C § 158(d)(3) (emphasis added).
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after the Section 8(d)(1) “notice” was given clearly had a different
meaning. As noted earlier, where Congress uses similar but different terms
at two different places in the same statute, it may normally be assumed that
the difference is deliberate and significant.187 By this reasoning, the original
loss-of-status provision could not have referred to Section 8(d)(3)’s
requirement that the initiating party “notif[y]” the FMCS.
Congress arguably weakened this argument when it enacted the Health
Care Amendments by adding the sentence containing clauses (A), (B), and
(C) to Section 8(d). This new sentence referred not only to the “notice of
section 8(d)(1),” but also to the “notice of section 8(d)(3)” and the “notice .
. . given to the [FMCS] under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence.” 188
The additional use of “notice” rather than “notifies” or “notification” with
respect to the FMCS arguably blurred Section 8(d)’s previous distinction
between the required notice to the other party and the required notification
to the FMCS; and this in turn might be read to imply that the loss-of-status
provision applied to both terms. However, since the new sentence in which
clauses (A) and (B) appeared referred solely by its own terms to a dispute
at a “health care institution,” it follows that the blurring of “notice” and
“notify” in that sentence is inapplicable to workers outside health care.
Accordingly, Section 8(d)’s original use of those terms still weighs against
applying the loss-of-status provision to strikers outside health care for their
unions’ 8(d)(3) infractions.
4. Other Adjudicatory Authority
This interpretation of the loss-of-status provision is confirmed not only
by the Health Care Amendments’ own legislative history—discussed
separately below—but also by the Supreme Court’s, the Board’s and other
courts’ treatment of the amendments ever since they were enacted. In 1975,
the year after the amendments became law, the Board, in Bio-Medical
Applications of San Diego,189 stated categorically: “[i]n our opinion an
examination of this legislation and its legislative history shows that the
purpose of the 1974 health care amendment was to extend the jurisdiction
of the Board to all health care institutions . . . .”190 Two years later, in

187

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(A) – (C) (2006).
189
216 N.L.R.B. 631 (1975).
190
Id. at 631 (emphasis added). Bio-Medical Applications confirmed that the Health
Care Amendments’ coverage included institutions which were “local in character.” See
also Walker Methodist Residence and Health Care Center, 227 NLRB 1630, 1632
(1977) (“[t]he purpose of the 1974 amendments was to extend the protection of the Act
to employees of nonprofit health care institutions who were excluded from coverage by
the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendment”).
188
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District 1199 (United Hospitals of Newark),191 the Board, in interpreting
the amendments’ new Section 8(g),192 recognized that “Congress chose to
treat the health industry uniquely because of its importance to human life . .
. . Consequently, a determination of the lawfulness of any picketing
without notice of a health care institution must take into account the high
public interest in uninterrupted health services.”193 The Board distinguished
precedent addressing picketing by workers outside health care: “[t]hose
cases did not deal with the unique circumstances presented by health care
institutions and did not therefore require the same balancing of interests
mandated by the health care amendments.”194
The following year, in Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,195 the Supreme
Court reviewed the Health Care Amendments for the first time. 196 Like the
Board, the Court noted from the outset that the amendments were intended
“to extend [the Act’s] coverage and protection to employees of nonprofit
health-care institutions.”197 Moreover, the Court observed, the features of
the health-care industry were distinctive: “[i]n extending coverage of the
Act to nonprofit hospitals, Congress enacted special provisions for strike
notice and mediation, applicable solely to the health-care industry, intended
to avoid disruptions of patient care caused by strikes.”198 And yet again,
echoing the Board: “Congress addressed its concern for the unique
problems presented by labor disputes in the health-care industry by adding
specific strike-notice and mediation provisions designed to avert
interruption in the delivery of critical health-care services . . . .”199
191

232 N.L.R.B. 443 (1977), enf’d, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978) (table).
29 U.S.C. §158(g) (2006). Section 8(g) (requiring that a union to give ten days
written notice to a health-care employer and to the FMCS in advance of any strike); see
also United Hospitals, 232 N.L.R.B. 443 (1977) (addressing whether non-strike
picketing fell within Sec. 8(g)’s notice requirement).
193
232 N.L.R.B. at 444 (emphasis added); see also New York State Nurses Ass., 334
N.L.R.B. 798, 800 (2001) (quoting United Hospitals, 232 N.L.R.B. at 444); St. Francis
Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 950 (1984) (“Congress was concerned that ‘the needs of
patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act,’ and
therefore imposed certain restrictions not applicable to other industries”) (internal
citation omitted, emphasis added), remanded for other reasons, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
194
232 N.L.R.B. at n.11 (emphasis added). In dissent with respect to Sec. 8(g), Member
Jenkins agreed that “[t]he major purposes of [the] Health Care Amendments of 1974, of
which Section 8(g) is a part, were (1) to extend coverage of the Act to employees of
nonprofit health care facilities and (2) to provide a mechanism to insure the
minimization of disruptions in patient care caused by labor disputes.” Id. at 446
(emphasis added).
195
437 U.S. 483 (1978).
196
Beth Israel addressed Sec. 7 solicitation rights on hospital property.
197
437 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added).
198
Id. at 496-497 (emphasis added).
199
Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
192
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In 1991, in American Hospital Ass. v. NLRB,200 the Court again reviewed
the Health Care Amendments, this time in connection with the Board’s
rulemaking authority.201 Again the Court noted (and the hospital
association challenging the Board agreed) that the amendments “extended”
the Act to the health-care industry.202
If Congress’s only purpose in the Health Care Amendments was to
“extend” the NLRA to cover the “unique” features of the health-care
sector—as the amendments’ legislative history, discussed below, further
confirms—then the Health Care Amendments did not change the law with
respect to workers outside the health-care sector, even by the substitution
of “any notice period” for “the sixty-day period” in Section 8(d)’s loss-ofstatus provision.203 That is, the sole authority for applying the loss-of-status
provision to Section 8(d)(3) infractions for workers outside health care
remains the plurality opinion in Fort Smith.
5. The Legislative History
The above analysis of the Health Care Amendments has not relied on the
amendments’ legislative history, except indirectly to the extent it was relied
upon by the cited Board and court authorities. This was for the purpose of
demonstrating the force of the argument that the amendments did not
legislate or endorse the plurality position in Fort Smith for workers outside
health care, even without support from the legislative history. But that
history only strengthens the argument, not by what it affirmatively states
but by what it confirms by omission—that in 1974 Congress did not intend
to legislate except in the health-care sector.
If Congress had intended to legislate the holding in Fort Smith for
workers outside health care, or even simply to defer to the Board’s
application of the loss-of-status provision to those workers whatever that
application might be (or however it might change), one would expect to
find this expressed somewhere in the legislative history, even with minor
emphasis. One would at least expect the history to state, at some point,
something to the effect that “the bill extends the same strike sanctions that
already exist for other workers to the health-care sector, with even stricter
200

499 U.S. 606 (1991).
Id. (addressing the Board’s authority to issue rules defining appropriate
representation units in health care).
202
Id. at 615, 616.
203
“[I]n the complete absence of any evidence that the rewording was aimed at
bringing about substantive changes other than the one expressly reflected in the
legislative history [or] evidence of congressional intent or at least attention to the
change in deciding whether to give the change its literal effect . . . [internal citations
omitted] courts are not bound to read a statute literally in a manner entirely at odds with
its history and apparent intent.” Falvey, 676 F.2d at 875.
201
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features;” or that “the Board’s holding in Fort Smith will now also apply to
health-care workers;” or that “the union’s failure to provide any of the
required timely notices to the FMCS will deprive its health-care members
of the Act’s protection if they go on strike, just as it already deprives
strikers in other industries.” The legislative history says none of these
things—anywhere. It never refers to the loss-of-status provision’s
application to workers outside health care, and it never even mentions Fort
Smith. In fact, the legislative history almost never even refers to workers in
other industries, let alone to strikes by them or to Section 8(d)’s related
sanctions.
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the
bill that was eventually enacted began by summarizing its essential effects,
stating that it “repeals the present exemption [for nonprofit hospitals],
establishes certain new procedures governing labor relations in health care
institutions, and creates a new definition of health care institution . . . . The
bill also contains several additional special provisions designed to facilitate
collective bargaining settlements and to provide advance notice of any
strike or picketing involving a health care institution . . . .”204 With respect
to notice requirements, the report stated:
In the Committee's deliberations on this measure, it was
recognized that the needs of patients in health care institutions
required special consideration in the Act including a provision
requiring hospitals to have sufficient notice of any strike or
picketing to allow for appropriate arrangements to be made for the
continuance of patient care in the event of a work stoppage. In this
respect the Committee believed that the special notice
requirements should be extended to all proprietary and nonprofit
hospitals,
convalescent
hospitals,
health
maintenance
organizations, health or medical clinics, nursing homes, extended
care facilities or other institutions devoted to the care of sick,
infirm or aged persons. Accordingly this bill will provide the same
procedures for employees of all health care institutions.205
In short, the “special” notice requirements which were being added to
Section 8(d) to meet the “special” needs of medical patients were being
extended only to “all health care institutions.”206
The Committee’s opening description of the bill’s central provisions was
204

S. Rep. No. 93-766 (2nd Sess. 1974), at 1; Legislative History of Coverage of
Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act, House Committee on
Education and Labor, May 20, 1974, at 8.
205
Legislative History at 10 (emphasis added).
206
Id.
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similarly correlated strictly to health care. For example, with respect to the
new subsection (g), requiring an additional 10-day notice to a health-care
employer and to the FMCS in advance of an actual strike, “[v]iolation of
this provision will constitute an unfair labor practice [and t]he failure to
give the statutory notice will be remedial under Section 10(j) of the Act
[i.e., subject to injunction].”207 The Committee made one reference to
“other employees” in connection with Section 8(g), but this was only to
emphasize that health-care employees were not to be disfavored under the
new requirement.208
With respect to the amendments’ extension of the sixty-day and thirtyday notice periods already required in Sections 8(d)(1) and (3) to ninety
days and sixty days respectively, the Committee stated only: “[t]he bill
extends the 60 day notice to 90 days and requires the FMCS to receive 60
days’ notice instead of 30 days, in the case of health care institutions.”209
Further with respect to the FMCS, in the subsection of its report entitled
“Contract Notice Requirements,” the Committee stated only that the bill
“provides for mandatory mediation by the parties with the FMCS,” and for
initial contract negotiations “requires 30 days’ notice to the FMCS, in the
case of collective bargaining involving health care institutions.”210 In the
subsection of the report entitled “Effect On Existing Law,” the Committee
addressed bargaining units, secondary employer status, supervisors,
recognition picketing, priority case handling—all specific to health care—
and the cost of the legislation.211 This subsection made no reference to any
effect on “existing” notice requirements or on the related consequences of
noncompliance. In discussing priority case handling, however, the
Committee noted that “[m]any of the witnesses before the Committee,
including both employee and employer witnesses, stressed the uniqueness
of health care institutions” and “the need to avoid disruption of patient care
wherever possible.”212 In consequence, the Committee affirmed:
It was this sensitivity to the need for continuity of patient care
that led the Committee to adopt amendments with regard to notice
207

Id. at 11, citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).
Id. (“[T]he public interest demands that employees of health care institutions be
accorded the same type of treatment under the law as other employee[s] in our society,
and that the [8(g)] notice not be utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights.
It is clear, therefore, that a labor organization will not be required to serve a ten day
notice or to wait until the expiration of the ten day notice when the employer has
committed unfair labor practices as in Mastro Plastics Corp v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 . . .
.”)
209
Id. at 12.
210
Id.
211
. Legislative History at 12-14
212
Id. at 13.
208

2013]

MEDIATION BY MASS DISCHARGE

319

requirements and other procedures related to potential strikes and
picketing.213
Neither the “Contract Notice Requirements” nor the “Effect On Existing
Law” subsection of the committee report made any reference to Section
8(d)’s loss-of-status provision. The report’s section-by-section breakdown,
however, stated as follows: “[t]he Amendment substitutes ‘any notice’ in
lieu of the ‘sixty-day notice’ in existing law to allow for the additional
notice requirements placed on representations of employees of health care
institutions. The loss of status is also extended to violations of the newly
created ten-day notice period of section 8(g).”214
None of this report language endorsed in any way the application of the
loss-of-status provision to violations of Section 8(d)(3) for workers outside
health care; still less did it endorse Fort Smith. It rather confirmed that the
sole purpose for the substitution of “any notice period” for “the sixty-day
notice period” in the loss-of-status provision was to “allow for” the
“additional” notice requirements created for “employees of health care
institutions.”215
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor on the
amendments was practically verbatim of the Senate Committee report.216
The treatment of the amendments on the Senate floor was entirely
consistent with the Senate Committee report, because virtually no reference
was made by any senator to the loss-of-status provision.217 Attention
focused on other provisions in the bill, and on controversial floor
amendments which were offered concerning other issues, some of them not
limited to health care. In opposing those amendments, the bill’s sponsors
were forced to emphasize repeatedly that the bill as reported from the
Committee was limited strictly to the health-care industry. This was a
major justification for their opposing the floor amendments, approval of
which would have jeopardized the bill’s passage. In opposing an
213

Id. (emphasis added). The Committee directed the Board to give priority to unfair
labor practice charges concerning the health care industry “consistent with the existing
statutory priority requirements for particular classes of cases.” Id. at 14.
214
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
215
In this respect, the minority views expressed in the report in no way opposed the
majority view. Id. at 46-52.
216
H. Rep. No. 93-1051 (2nd Sess. 1974); Legislative History of Coverage of
Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor Relations Act, 1974, at 269.
217
In fact, the only even arguable reference to the loss-of-status provision came when
Senator Taft (R-Ohio), the chief Republican sponsor, addressed the new Sec. 8(g),
requiring ten days’ notice before a health care strike: “[A] violation of 8(g) will
constitute an independent unfair labor practice and may also constitute a refusal to
bargain under 8(b)(3). Violation of this subsection may also constitute violation of
other provisions of the Act.” 120 Cong. Rec. 13559 (1974).
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amendment to shift jurisdiction over unfair labor practices from the Board
to the federal courts, for example, Senator Taft (R-Ohio) declared: “[t]he
issue before us relates solely to the coverage of nonprofit hospitals and
similar health care institutions. The bill is tailored specifically to deal with
labor-management relations in that area.”218 Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.),
another key sponsor, agreed: “This bill is designed for a specific purpose at
a specific time, to stabilize relations in a particular field . . . [w]e have
resisted such amendments to this bill, which deals only with the question of
access of hospital workers to the NLRB.”219 The legislative purpose, in
short, remained consistently to make law only in the health-care sector.
On the House floor, the emphasis was the same. The key Republican
sponsor, John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), did make a reference to the loss-ofstatus provision, but only in connection with health care.220
When the legislation approved by each chamber went to House-Senate
conference, the notice requirements and the loss-of-status provision were
left as written.221 In presenting the conference report on the Senate floor,
Committee Chairman Harrison Williams (D-N.J.) emphasized:
This legislation is the product of compromise, and the NLRB in
administering the act should understand specifically that this
committee understood the issues confronting it, and went as far as
it decided to go and no further and the Labor Board should use
extreme caution not to read into this act by implication—or
general logical reasoning—something that is not contained in the
bill, its report, and the explanation thereof.222
Senator Williams concluded:
My overriding point is that in this carefully tailored legislation
218

120 Cong. Rec. 12983 (1974).
Id. at 12983, 13537; see also id. at 13538.
220
According to Rep. Ashbrook, “The mandated mediation and the ten-day strike
notice provide protection to the public, involve the mediation services to help resolve
disputes, and give the hospital ample warning should the dispute fail to be resolved. If
the union or employees fail to observe the notice provisions, including the ten-day
strike notice, they lose their status as employees. In other words, they can be dismissed
for striking without giving the public the protection the bill provides.” Id. at 16900.
221
The conference changes were limited to exceptions for employees with religious
convictions and a board of inquiry in cases where the FMCS fails to successfully
resolve a dispute which threatens to disrupt health care. Legislative History at 348-349.
222
120 Cong. Rec. 22575 (1974) (emphasis added). In denying that a violation of Sec.
8(g) would also violate Sec. 8(b)(3), or that a threat to strike in violation of Sec. 8(g)
would be unlawful, Sen. Williams emphasized that “if the committee had intended”
either meaning “it would have said so.” Id.
219
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Congress decided to treat the health care industry uniquely in
certain respects. It decided to go so far, and no more. I trust this
bill will be treated by the NLRB and its General Counsel in the
same spirit, and not as an excuse to search out and litigate all
possible situations, or substitute its will for that of Congress.223
In emphasizing that Congress “decided to go so far, and no more,”
Senator Williams was clearly referring to the application of the
amendments to the health-care industry. However, this emphasis on going
“so far and no more,” combined with the sponsors’ emphatic limitation of
the amendments’ impact to the health-care sector, raises a powerful barrier
against inferring a Congressional endorsement of Fort Smith. If the Board
was barred from reading into the Health Care Amendments “something that
is not contained in the bill, its report, and the explanation thereof” even
with respect to health-care employees, the subject of the legislation, it
would be all the less permissible for the Board to interpret them to affect
other workers.
In short, all the available evidence indicates that workers outside health
care were unaffected by the change from “the sixty-day period” to “any
notice period specified in this sub-section” in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status
provision. Moreover, Congress “[could] not fairly be held to have made
such an intrusion on employees’ rights . . . without some more explicit
expression of its purpose to do so than appears” in the Health Care
Amendments or their legislative history.224 The plurality opinion in Fort
Smith therefore remains the only purported authority for applying the lossof-status provision to 8(d)(3) violations outside health care.225

223

Id. at 22576. In a joint statement on the conference report for himself and the chief
Democratic sponsor of the amendments in the House, Rep. Ashbrook again referred to
the loss-of-status provision and its application to Sec. 8(d)’s “notice periods,” as
amended, but solely in connection with violations of Sec. 8(g). Id. at 22949.
224
Mastro Plastics, 350 U.S. 289.
225
Nor can Congress’s inaction with respect to the NLRA from 1963 to 1974 be
considered “acquiescence” to the ruling in Fort Smith. See Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) (quoting Patterson v.
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)) (“[O]ur observations on the
acquiescence doctrine indicate its limitations as an expression of Congressional intent.
‘It does not follow . . . that Congress’s failure to overturn a statutory precedent is
reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is impossible to assert with any degree of
assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional
approval of the [courts’] statutory interpretation . . . .’”); see also Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (“[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence
of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle”).
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IV. FORT SMITH ABIDES
Since their enactment in 1974, the Board has not addressed the Health
Care Amendments’ change in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision with
respect to workers outside the health sector. In fact, the Board has
continued to rely on Fort Smith without even noting that “the sixty-day
period” was changed to “any period.” In a 1975 case focusing on whether
the amendments’ new notice requirements should be applied retroactively
to workers at a nursing home, the Board decided in the negative but
implicitly recognized, citing only Fort Smith, that a strike following a
violation of Section 8(d)(3) after the amendments’ enactment would
deprive health-care strikers of the right to reinstatement.226 At least seven
subsequent reported cases to date relying on Fort Smith involved situations
where strikers outside health care either lost their protected status and their
jobs or were put at risk of those consequences by their unions’ negligent
failure to comply with Section 8(d)(3).227 None of these cases questioned
the viability of Fort Smith or discussed the impact of the Health Care
Amendments on the protected status of workers outside health care.
In 2001, Fort Smith was applied for the first time to a hiring hall setting.

226

Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons, Masonic Home, 220 N.L.R.B. 1318 n.3
(1975), aff’d, 548 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
227
Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. Ass Local 38, 288 F.3d 491
(2002) (noting that the union had filed notice with FMCS and with the state mediation
agency of the wrong state and that the strikers lost protected status); Douglas Autotech,
357 N.L.R.B. 11 (2011), review pending (D.C. Cir.); Boghosian Raisin Packing Co.,
342 N.L.R.B. 383 (2004); Freeman Decorating Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001), enf.
denied, 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Fairprene Indus. Prod’s., 292 N.L.R.B .797, 80203 (1989), enf’d, 880 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1989) (table), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019
(1990) (where employer fired some strikers following union’s failure to comply with
Sec. 8(d)(3), Board found the strikers initially lost protection under Fort Smith but the
employer agreed to reinstate them before announcing the discharges and thereby
restored their protected employee status); Sheet Metal Workers Local 49 (Aztech
Int’l.), 291 N.L.R.B. 282 (1988), aff’d, 902 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. granted on
other grounds and remanded, 499 U.S. 933 (1991),for consideration in light of Airline
Pilots Ass. Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1990) (in duty-of-fair-representation case
against union that called a strike less than 30 days after providing notice to the FMCS,
the Board assumed the strikers were lawfully discharged, quoting loss-of-status
provision without further discussion); The Brandeis School, 287 N.L.R.B. 836 (1987),
aff’d as modified, The Brandeis Sch. v NLRB, 871 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1989) (where union
called strike without filing 8(d)(3) notices, General Counsel had no viable claim that
employer acted unlawfully in refusing to reinstate strikers when they offered to return
to work). See also Retail Store Employees Local 322 (Town & Country Supermkts),
240 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1979) (although union sent notice only to FMCS in the belief that
no state mediation agency existed, state department of human resources was such an
agency and union violated Sec. 8(d)(3), “potentially” exposing strikers to loss of
status).
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In Freeman Decorating Co.,228 eleven convention and trade show
employers in New Orleans who were under separate contract but negotiated
jointly with the International Association of Stage and Theatrical
Employees Local 39, decided they wanted to change their pool of available
workers. Under their contracts with Local 39, they were required to hire all
their employees through the local’s hiring hall (almost always for
temporary slots), at which the local’s members and non-members were
registered.229 When the parties failed to reach new agreements by the time
their contracts expired in 2001, the union called a strike and refused to refer
registrants from its hiring hall to those employers. Over the next few
weeks, as the strike continued, the employers learned that Local 39 had not
filed an 8(d)(3) notice with the FMCS. They quickly sent “termination”
letters to over 2,600 individuals who had been referred to work for any
employers under contract with Local 39 in the recent past, telling these
people in effect that they were ineligible for future employment.230 Some of
these people had never worked for any of the respondent employers, and
nearly half were not even currently registered with the local.231 In fact,
none of the approximately 2,200 individuals whom the Board found to be
discriminatees was being employed by any of the respondent employers
when the strike began.232
In addition, before and during the contract negotiations preceding the
strike, the employers had deliberated among themselves whether it would
be legally possible to “fire the union” and use another source for employee
referrals, including the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.233 During the
strike, several of the employers opened discussions with Carpenters for this
purpose.234 When or shortly after they sent out their termination letters, the
respondent employers also withdrew recognition from Local 39.235 A few
months later, three of them (including the two largest) signed contracts
with the Carpenters.236
A Board majority (Members Wilma Liebman and Dennis Walsh) found
that the workers who received termination letters had no employment
relationship with any of the employers, and were therefore not those
228

336 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001), enf. denied, 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 2-3.
230
Id. at 4 n.17.
231
Id. at 3-4. The employers used a list of covered beneficiaries of Local 39’s health
and welfare fund. Each employer under contract with the local made contributions to
the fund for the employees it hired by referral from the union. Many workers on that
list had never worked for the respondent employers in Freeman. Id. at 4, 7-8.
232
Id. at 7.
233
Id. at 2-3.
234
336 N.L.R.B. at 3 (2001).
235
Id. at 4.
236
Id. at 2-3.
229
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employers’ “employees” subject to loss of protected status under Section
8(d).237 In addition, the majority found that the recipients, even if assumed
to be employees subject to loss of protected status, had not been shown to
have engaged in the strike. In this connection, the Board emphasized that
the established hiring procedure “did not involve, or even permit, their
soliciting employment from the respondent employers;” that only about
half were even registered with the hiring hall at the time of the strike; and
that “it is not clear how many even knew which employers were being
struck.”238 They had therefore not lost the protection of the Act. Their
global “discharge” by the respondent employers for the open purpose of
“firing the union” and the respondents’ withdrawal of recognition were
consequently unlawful.239
In passing, the majority noted that application of the loss-of-status
provision here “might seem especially harsh, since it would follow from an
apparent ministerial error by the union or its counsel in failing to give
notice, as opposed to some action that would suggest culpability on the part
of the union or complicity on the part of represented employees.”240 The
majority also observed that “[t]he parties here appear to have assumed that
employees lose their protected status where they engage in a strike which is
unlawful solely due to the union’s failure to file timely notification with the
FMCS, under the authority of Fort Smith.”241 These comments seemed to
question, for the first time, the viability of Fort Smith. However, having
found that Section 8(d) was not applicable in this setting for other reasons,
the majority found it unnecessary to address “the application of Fort Smith
to this case.”242
Chairman Peter Hurtgen dissented, finding that the discriminatees were
employees covered by Section 8(d) and that they had engaged in an
unlawful strike through their union’s refusal to refer them for
employment.243
On appeal, a panel majority of the court of appeals agreed with Member
Hurtgen and denied enforcement.244 It found that Section 8(d)’s loss-ofstatus provision’s reference to “any employee” “signals that ‘employee’
237

Id. at 5-8.
Id. at 8.
239
Id. at 8-10.
240
336 N.L.R.B. at 6 (2001). The same observation could have been made, of course,
in almost every case where an 8(d)(3) infraction has led to the mass firing of strikers or
the risk thereof.
241
Id. n.26 (full citation omitted).
242
Id.
243
Id. at 18-19. Chairman Hurtgen did not cite Fort Smith or the Health Care
Amendments.
244
International Alliance of Stage and Theatrical Employees Local 39 v. NLRB, 334
F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
238
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should receive its broadest statutory definition, which both the Court and
the Board have consistently held to include hiring hall registrants and other
‘on call’ workers, regardless of whether they are engaged in a direct
employment relationship.”245 In addition, the court rejected the Board’s
finding that the discriminatees had not engaged in a strike within the
meaning of Section 8(d) as arbitrary, capricious, and “border[ing] on the
absurd.”246 And in one conclusory sentence, it found that the employers’
withdrawal of recognition after the mass “discharge” had been lawful.247
So in at least one U.S. Circuit, the doctrine of Fort Smith now applies
even to registrants of hiring halls, whether or not they are actually
employed, or actively participate in a strike, or ever were employed by any
of the struck employers. In the case of a strike following an 8(d)(3)
infraction in a hiring hall setting, all of the hall’s registrants lose the Act’s
protection unless they affirmatively apply for work to each and every
struck employer.
And then, in Boghosian Raisin, the Board legitimized a new use for the
loss-of-status provision as bequeathed by Fort Smith: as an excellent
employer’s club for extracting contract concessions from a recalcitrant
245

Id. at 34. In the D.C. Circuit’s view, the Board’s holding “creates an entire category
of employees who enjoy NLRA rights but do not shoulder its responsibilities,” and
forces employers to choose between “‘terminating’ hiring hall registrants and incurring
unfair labor practice charges or acceding to the union’s demands, no matter that they
were raised unlawfully.” Id. at 34-35. The D.C. Circuit’s expansive construction of
“any employee” as used in Sec. 8(d) ran counter to the Supreme Court’s narrow
construction in Mastro Plastics, which held that “any employee” did not include ULP
strikers and that such strikers were not covered by the loss-of-status provision. It also
clearly did not occur to the Freeman court that the Supreme Court and Board
authorities it cited for interpreting “employee” broadly were decided in the context of
protecting as many workers as possible and therefore favored interpreting an employee
exclusion as narrowly as possible. The court also ignored the employer’s privilege of
hiring striker replacements, and apparently considered it insignificant that no employer
in Freeman ever actually sought to hire more than a relatively few hiring hall
registrants at any time. The Act’s priority, in the D.C. Circuit’s apparent view, was to
punish any individual who had ever been employed by any employer under contract
with Local 39. The court however, did not address the scope of the phrase “any notice
period specified in this subsection” as it appears in the loss-of-status provision. Nor,
like Chairman Hurtgen, did the court cite Fort Smith or the Health Care amendments.
246
334 F.3d at 35.
247
Id. at 37 (ignoring the implications of NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494
U.S. 775, 788-96 (1990)). Curtin Matheson Scientific upheld the Board’s ruling that an
employer may not presume that a bargaining unit has lost majority support simply
because the unit’s members have been “permanently replaced” in an economic strike,
and absent a showing to that effect the employer must continue to recognize the union.
See Mimbres Mem’l Hosp. and Nursing Home, 342 N.L.R.B. 398, 403 (2004), aff’d,
483 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The Board applies a presumption that newly hired
employees support the union in the same proportion as the employees they have
replaced, absent strong evidence to the contrary.”).
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union.248 With the Board’s endorsement, an alert employer could exploit an
unfortunate union’s 8(d)(3) infraction not only to rid itself of a unionized
workforce; it could first use the threat of discharge to extract the bargaining
concessions it wanted from the union. If the coercion worked, the employer
would have achieved its bargaining goals while retaining an experienced
but demoralized workforce and a badly discredited union. If the coercion
failed, as in Boghosian, the workforce (or its most pro-union members)
could be replaced, the union ousted, and the terms of employment
unilaterally reduced in the employer’s favor. Also, of course, if the
employer discovered before a strike even occurred that the union had failed
to file timely notice with the FMCS, the employer was under no
obligation—notwithstanding Section 8(d)’s mandate to bargain “in good
faith”—to warn the union of its peril and lost nothing by withholding its
knowledge until it could threaten the strikers with mass discharge.249
The Boghosian Board completed the logical circle initiated by the Fort
Smith plurality: a notice requirement intended to strengthen collective
bargaining and to reduce industrial warfare has instead been made an
employer’s weapon to curtail union representation, avoid collective
bargaining, and return labor relations to the dark ages preceding the NLRA.
Board law in this respect is a “construction which serves neither of [the
Act’s] aims . . . to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare
and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for
their own benefit.”250 And to apply the post-1974 loss-of-status provision
for 8(d)(3) infractions outside health care is to do precisely what Senator
Williams, its chief Democratic sponsor, warned the Board not to do—“to
read into this act [the Health Care Amendments] by implication—or
general logical reasoning—something that is not contained in the bill, its
248

See supra notes 1-25.
Boghosian was not the first instance of an employer manipulating Sec. 8(d)’s notice
requirements for the purpose of subjecting its workers to mass discharge. In ABC Auto.
Prod’s., 307 N.L.R.B. 248 (1992), enf’d, 986 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1992), the employer
became aware that although the union had timely mailed its 8(d)(1) notice of intent to
modify the expiring contract, delivery of the notice to the employer had (unknown to
the union) been significantly delayed in the mail due to negligence by the postal
service. As a result, the union was unaware that the sixty-day notice period had not
expired by the date it called a strike. Like the Boghosian employer, however, the
employer sat on its knowledge and goaded the union into striking, then fired all the
strikers. In that instance, the Board found that the employer, by its actions, had waived
its right to enforce the loss-of-status provision and acted unlawfully. 307 N.L.R.B. at
249. The Boghosian majority, however, distinguished ABC on the grounds that in the
latter case the union was not even guilty of negligence while (“most importantly”) the
employer overtly manipulated it into launching the strike. 342 N.L.R.B. at 387. The
passive manipulation that occurred in Boghosian, in the majority’s view, was entirely
distinguishable.
250
Lion Oil,supra, 352 U.S. at 289.
249
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report, and the explanation thereof.”251
The most recent reported case implicating Fort Smith is Douglas
Autotech,252 decided in 2011. Here again the union intended to comply with
Section 8(d)(3) and thought it had done so before it went on strike; again
the notice to the FMCS was not actually sent due to a ministerial error;253
and again the employer discovered the error and attempted to use the lossof-status sanction as a bargaining club, then attempted to fire all the
strikers.254 Here, however, a Board majority found that even though the
strikers had initially lost their protected status, the employer had effectively
restored it during the strike by repeatedly promising to reinstate them in
their former positions whenever the strike ended.255 The employer had
thereby “reemployed” the strikers within the meaning of the loss-of-status
provision’s proviso that loss of protected status “shall terminate if and
when [the striker] is reemployed by such employer.”256 Their subsequent
mass discharge for engaging in otherwise protected activity was
consequently unlawful.257 As a result, 114 unit members narrowly escaped
losing their jobs, but Fort Smith was again cited without analysis.258
CONCLUSION
Unions, like other human institutions, remain fallible. This is particularly
true of local unions that have no strike experience, and also of physically
isolated or newly organized local unions which are still learning their
myriad representational responsibilities, often in highly embattled and
under-staffed circumstances. And ministerial and clerical errors of
omission will be committed on occasion, not only by union officers but by
employers and even by federal agencies like the NLRB and the FMCS.
251

120 Cong. Rec. 22575 (1974).
357 NLRB No. 111 (2011), review pending (D.C. Cir.) (ordered in abeyance as of
Feb. 19. 2013).
253
In this case, the human impact of the error on the responsible union official, given
its potential consequences, is palpable in the ALJ’s decision: “Winkle’s [the union’s
chief negotiator] testimony about the failure to file the required 30-day notice was quite
dramatic. Twice during his account, he struggled to keep his composure. It was evident
that his role in precipitating these unfortunate events has had a profound effect on
him.” 357 N.L.R.B., No. 111, slip op. at 21 n.13.
254
Id. at 2-3.
255
Id. at 4-6.
256
Id. at 3 n.7.
257
Id. at 5-8. Douglas Autotech and its holding were similar to Fairprene Industrial
Products, 292 N.L.R.B. 797; see supra note 228.
258
357 NLRB No. 111, slip op. at 4. The majority, moreover, specified in effect that it
was not narrowing the holding in Boghosian: “We do not hold that reemployment will
occur whenever an employer responds to an unlawful strike with anything other than
immediate termination.” Id. at 8 n.23.
252
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Unions outside the health sector will unknowingly fail to file timely FMCS
notice in the future, and their union members will again go on strike in fatal
ignorance. In most cases these infractions will have no impact on resolving
the underlying bargaining dispute.259 Are they to be deprived of their jobs
and their vulnerability exploited by their employers in the same way as
their predecessors since 1963?
As noted earlier, the Board has never held that the Health Care
Amendments’ replacement of “the sixty-day period” with “any notice
period specified in this subsection” in Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status
provision was a Congressional endorsement of the plurality opinion in Fort
Smith.260 For that matter, the Board has never discussed the impact of that
change on workers outside health care. But there is no need for the Board
to address that question as long as it continues to rely on Fort Smith as its
operative precedent. If the Board ever reconsiders Fort Smith, of course, it
will also have to address the 1974 change in the loss-of-status provision.
When the Board decides to review an important precedent for possible
reversal and invites interested parties to file briefs, it likes to emphasize
that it “continues to believe that it is its obligation under the Act to
continually evaluate whether its decisions and rules are serving their
statutory purposes.”261 A precedent which subjects untold numbers of
innocent workers outside the health care sector to loss of the Act’s
protection and their jobs for engaging in what is supposed to be protected
activity would seem to qualify for such evaluation. This is particularly true
where the precedent did not even command a Board majority when it was
issued. “Unlike a good wine, a mistake does not get better with age.”262
The Board is barred from abandoning the Fort Smith plurality’s
interpretation of Section 8(d)’s loss-of-status provision for non-health care
workers only if Congress, in the Health Care Amendments, prohibited it
from doing so. As shown above, Congress did no such thing. The Board
should therefore correct this error in labor law when the next opportune
case arises. It should do so even if it is uncertain whether that correction
would today be upheld in federal court. The increasing hostility to unions,
to the Board, and even to the Act shown by ideologically driven federal
judges in recent years does not displace the Board’s responsibility to act on
behalf of the principles and policy goals embodied in the NLRA: to
encourage and protect collective bargaining for the purpose of maintaining
industrial peace. If American labor law is to become an instrument for
achieving social Darwinism, that should happen over the Board’s
259

See supra note 30.
See supra Part III(B).
261
E.g., Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 56, slip op. at 1 (2010)
(Most such invitations are unpublished).
262
WKYC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, slip op. at 8 (2012).
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